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INTRODUCTION
Before reading this article, please take the following multiple choice
quiz:
(1) You are the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Marsha Tudor Styles,
Inc. (MTS), one of the country’s largest retailers of products for
homemakers. Your company is highly profitable and closely identified
with its founder and Chairman of the Board of Directors, Marsha Tudor,
who publishes a magazine and hosts a television show concerning
homemaking. Recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
investigated Tudor for suspected insider trading for selling one million
dollars of stock in a company owned by a personal friend, just before a
sharp decline in the price of its stock. In the course of her voluntary
cooperation with the investigation, Tudor stated that she sold the stock
pursuant to a pre-established stop-loss order. When news of the
investigation became public, Tudor asserted her innocence of insider
trading on a national news program. Although Tudor has not been charged
with insider trading, she has been indicted for obstruction of justice for
telling federal investigators that she sold her stock pursuant to a stop-loss
order, and for securities fraud for attempting to prop up the value of MTS
stock by falsely proclaiming her innocence to the public. You have known
Ms. Tudor for many years and tend to believe that she is innocent of the
charges, although you cannot be entirely sure. In this situation, which of the
following constitutes the ethically appropriate action for you to take in your
capacity as CEO?
(a) Publicly support Ms. Tudor and offer whatever aid the corporation
can give her in her effort to clear her name.
(b) Take no action. This matter does not concern the corporation.
(c) Consult with corporate counsel and immediately take steps designed
to protect the corporation against any potential civil liability, and to
preserve its defenses against any potential criminal charges.
(d) Ask Ms. Tudor to resign as Chairman of the Board of Directors until
her legal troubles are resolved and cooperate with the government’s
criminal investigation of Ms. Tudor to the extent that doing so is consistent
with preserving the company’s legal defenses and respecting all promises
of confidentiality including those granted by corporate counsel under the
attorney-client privilege.
(e) Authorize the corporation to plead guilty to securities fraud and aid
the government’s criminal investigation of Ms. Tudor in every way,
including waiving the corporation’s attorney-client privilege and turning
over records of all of Ms. Tudor’s appointments, phone calls, e-mails, and
confidential consultations with the corporate counsel.
(2) You are a senior executive at the Stone Fund, a large mutual fund
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company. The majority of investors in the Stone Fund are small investors,
but the fund has several large investors as well as several institutional
investors. Until recently, Gordon Gekko was one of the fund’s most
successful manager/brokers. He was responsible for acquiring most of the
large investors in the fund. He apparently did this by allowing several of
these investors to make trades after 4:00 p.m., which is illegal. Budd Fox,
a junior broker who worked for Gekko, processed many of the late trades.
Fox, who had been hired right out of business school, was not at first aware
that he was doing anything wrong. Gekko’s high status in the company, his
forceful personality, and his assurance that the late trades were perfectly
acceptable and were standard operating procedure in the industry led Fox to
carry out Gekko’s orders without qualm. Eventually becoming suspicious,
Fox approached Stone Fund’s corporate counsel in confidence to inquire
about the legality of his actions. Upon thus learning of the late trades,
Stone Fund immediately fired Gekko and reported his actions to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and SEC. Which of the following constitutes
the ethically appropriate action for you to take with respect to Fox?
(a) Assign him to work with a broker who can serve as an ethical mentor,
and employ the legal resources of the company to help him defend himself
against any criminal charges that may be brought as a result of his
association with Gekko.
(b) Allow him to continue working for the company, but do not use
corporate resources to aid him in defending any criminal charges that are
brought against him personally.
(c) Fire Fox.
(d) Fire Fox and recommend that the company report his activities to the
DOJ and the SEC.
(e) Fire Fox and recommend that the company not only report his
activities to the DOJ and the SEC, but offer to cooperate with the
prosecutors in building a case against Fox by waiving the company’s
attorney-client privilege and turning over to the government any evidence
that could possibly aid in establishing his guilt.
(3) You are the new CEO of Endrun, Inc., a very troubled corporation.
Acting without the knowledge of Endrun’s former CEO, Kevin Lie, the
company’s Chief Operating Officer (COO) and Chief Accounting Officer
(CAO) had been using improper accounting practices to disguise the size of
the company’s debt and inflate its profits. When this fraud came to light,
Endrun was forced to restate its earnings for the past several years, causing
the company to suffer serious losses in the third and fourth quarters as well
as a sharp decline in the price of its stock. The COO and CAO have since
pled guilty to securities and wire fraud, and Lie resigned as CEO. You
stepped in to try to staunch the bleeding and revive the company. You
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have just learned that Lie has been indicted for wire fraud for statements he
made at an “All Employee Meeting” video teleconference. At that
meeting, Lie said:
(i) “The third quarter is looking great. We will hit our numbers. We are
continuing to have strong growth in our businesses, and I think we are
positioned for a strong fourth quarter.”
(ii) “I have strongly encouraged our officers to buy additional Endrun
stock. Some, including myself, have done so over the last couple of
months and others will probably do so in the future. My personal belief is
that Endrun stock is an incredible bargain at current prices.”
(iii) “Liquidity is fine. As a matter of fact, it’s better than fine, it’s
strong.”
The indictment claims that these statements constitute a scheme and
artifice to defraud Endrun and its shareholders of their intangible right to
Lie’s honest services because:
With regard to statement (i), Lie knew that Endrun was about to
announce a quarterly loss for the third quarter and that lowering the
previous earning statements was going to adversely affect the company.
With regard to statement (ii), Lie deliberately created the impression
with Endrun employees that his confidence in the company’s stock was
such that he had increased his personal ownership of Endrun stock in the
past two months, when, in fact, Lie knew that during the prior “couple of
months,” he had purchased approximately $4 million in Endrun stock but
sold $24 million in Endrun stock in response to margin calls, and that these
sales were concealed from Endrun employees and the rest of the investing
public.
With regard to statement (iii), Lie knew that the only readily available
source of liquidity was the $3 billion corporate line of credit, which, if
drawn, would signal the dire straits of Endrun’s finances.
Lie claims that none of his statements were false, that at the time he
made them he genuinely believed Endrun could overcome its problems,
that he was acting responsibly as CEO to maintain employee morale in a
time of crisis, and that the charges against him are driven by political
pressure to find a scapegoat for employee and investor losses on the stock
market. Which of the following constitutes the ethically appropriate action
for you to take as CEO?
(a) Publicly support Mr. Lie, offer whatever aid the corporation can give
him in defending himself against the charges, and honor the company’s
policy of reimbursing the legal expenses of corporate officers who incur
such expenses as a result of their activities on behalf of the corporation.
(b) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, but take
no other action with regard to Mr. Lie’s case.
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(c) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, and
consult with corporate counsel to determine the extent to which Mr. Lie’s
situation creates the risk of civil or criminal liability for the corporation and
take appropriate steps to defend against such liability.
(d) Honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy, but
cooperate with the government’s criminal investigation of Mr. Lie to the
extent that doing so is consistent with preserving the company’s legal
defenses and respecting all promises of confidentiality, including those
granted by corporate counsel under the attorney-client privilege.
(e) Do not honor the company’s legal expense reimbursement policy for
Mr. Lie, authorize the corporation to plead guilty to wire fraud, and aid the
government’s criminal investigation of Mr. Lie in every way, including
waiving the corporation’s attorney-client privilege, turning over all
corporate documents that may bear on the case, and attempting to recover
and turn over any corporate documents that Mr. Lie may have in his
personal possession.
Thank you for taking the quiz. The purpose of this Article is to explore
how federal efforts to combat “white collar” crime bear on the answers to
these and similar questions.
Specifically, I intend to examine how the federal standard for corporate
criminal responsibility, the requirements of several of the federal statutes
used to combat white collar crime, and the incentives created by United
States Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations1 influence the decisions of
business people confronted with difficult ethical dilemmas. I will suggest
that, in the context of federal criminal law, there are many ways in which
compliance is not ethical and ethical behavior is not compliance. As a
result, the current federal campaign against white collar crime frequently
undermines, rather than enhances, the efforts of business people to behave
ethically.
I do not mean for the title of this article to be misleading. “Ethics and
the Problem of White Collar Crime” may suggest an article arguing that the
increasing frequency of white collar crime requires renewed efforts to
ensure that business people behave more ethically and obey the law. This
is clearly not the thesis I pursue. But the fact that the title can suggest such
a thesis reflects two uncritically accepted assumptions that often lie at the
heart of efforts to reduce business-related crime. These assumptions are
that the law commands only ethical behavior and that business people who
behave ethically have nothing to fear from the law. Although these
assumptions may generally be true, they patently are not in an increasing

1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2004) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.], available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP8.pdf.
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number of cases that can produce achingly poignant situations for business
people who act in naive reliance upon them.
The sole professional obligation of federal prosecutors is to punish and,
to whatever extent possible, prevent violation of federal criminal law. In
most cases, business people, too, have an obligation to ensure that members
of their firms do not violate federal law, but this is not their only, or even
their primary, obligation. To employ current business terminology,
business people have obligations to their stakeholders. They have a
fiduciary duty to their principals, the stockholders, to use the stockholder’s
resources only as authorized and to advance the purposes for which the
firm was organized. They have contractual, as well as informal customary
obligations to their employees, customers, and suppliers. Further, they
have their ordinary ethical obligations as human beings to honor their
commitments and to deal honestly with others. These obligations can, and
to an increasing extent do, conflict with the obligation to take the most
effective steps to comply with federal law. When the law provides
incentives to violate one’s ethical duties to others, business people face a
difficult choice. Federal prosecutors do not. Business people must decide
the extent to which they can ethically expose their firm to the risk of legal
liability in order to meet their other obligations. Federal prosecutors,
whose only obligation is to the law, need only judge the level of the firm’s
legal compliance. Simply expressed, business people’s ethical dilemmas
are not federal prosecutors’ problem.
In this Article, I intend to explore the ethical difficulties this divergence
of interests poses for those engaged in business. In Part II, I will introduce
what is perhaps an idiosyncratic definition of white collar crime to
distinguish the efforts of the federal government to combat business-related
crime from traditional state-level criminal enforcement. I will then identify
the special difficulties that the traditional rules of criminal law pose for
federal efforts to police business activity, and detail the substantive and
procedural innovations that were introduced into federal criminal law to
surmount these difficulties. In Part III, I will identify five areas in which
these legal innovations create difficult ethical dilemmas for the
conscientious business person. Specifically, I will argue that these
innovations make it more difficult for businesses to realize organizational
justice, properly respect employees’ privacy, maintain needed
confidentiality, engender trust within the organization, and engage in
ethical self-assessment. In Part IV, I will conclude by providing an
explanation for the divergence between ethics and compliance and
suggesting that the solution to the problem of white collar crime may not
lie in the use of harsher measures to crack down on white collar criminals,
but in restraining the power of federal prosecutors to do so at all.

10/3/2005 1:33 PM

HASNAS

2005]
I.

ETHICS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME

585

THE LOGICAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE FEDERAL EFFORT TO SUPPRESS
WHITE COLLAR CRIME
A. The Nature of White Collar Crime

White collar crime can be defined in many ways. It has been defined as
crime committed by one of respectable or high social status2 or in the
course of one’s occupation,3 as crime that involves deceit or a breach of
trust,4 as nonviolent crime undertaken for personal gain,5 as crime that
involves a combination of these factors,6 and simply as business crime.7
None of these definitions specifies the class of offenses that I wish to
address in this article, however. I intend to restrict my focus to federal law,
and then even more narrowly to the particular subset of federal law that is
designed to police the behavior of those engaged in business for honest
dealing and compliance with regulatory requirements. Because all of the
above definitions include state offenses, and many include non-businessrelated crime as well, none of them correspond to the class of offense in
which I am interested. Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, I will
employ the phrase ‘white collar crime’ in a somewhat idiosyncratic manner
to refer exclusively to behavior that is the object of federal efforts to ensure
honest dealing and regulatory compliance in business.
Under this stipulative definition, white collar criminal law constitutes a
discrete subset of American criminal law. It is distinct from state criminal
2. EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THE UNCUT VERSION 7 (1983)
(explaining that “[w]hite collar crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed
by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation.”).
3. James W. Coleman, Toward an Integrated Theory of White-Collar Crime, 93 AM. J.
SOC. 406, 407 (1987) (finding that white collar crime consists of illegal acts by individuals
or groups who are otherwise conducting legal and respectable business).
4. Susan P. Shapiro, Collaring the Crime, Not the Criminal: Reconsidering the
Concept of White Collar-Crime, 55 AM. SOC. REV. 346, 346 (1990) (arguing that “white
collar criminals violate norms of trust, enabling them to rob without violence and burgle
without trespass.”).
5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT (1983) (“White Collar
Crimes are illegal acts that use deceit and concealment—rather than the application or threat
of physical force or violence—to obtain money, property, or service; to avoid the payment
or loss of money; or to secure a business or personal advantage.”); BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY
215 (2d ed. 1981) (“[N]onviolent crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed
by anyone having special technical and professional knowledge of business and
government, irrespective of the person’s occupation.”).
6. See Hamelkamp, J., Ball, R., and Townsend, K. (eds.), Definitional Dilemma: Can
and Should There Be a Universal Definition of White Collar Crime? PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ACADEMIC WORKSHOP (Morgantown, WV: National White Collar Crime Center Training
and Research Institute, 1996) 330 (describing white collar crime as “[i]llegal or unethical
acts that violate fiduciary responsibility or public trust, committed by an individual or
organization, usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of
high or respectable social status for personal or organizational gain.”).
7. See HARRY FIRST, FIRST’S BUSINESS CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS v (1990).
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law, which is directed against actions that either directly harm or violate the
rights of others or constitute inherently immoral activity—the so-called
morals offenses or victimless crimes. This “traditional” conception of
crime, which is the subject of the typical first-year law school course in
criminal law, consists of offenses such as murder, rape, kidnapping, and
theft as well as prostitution, use of illegal narcotics, and, somewhat
famously, taking a girl under the age of sixteen out of the care of her
parents without their consent. White collar crime is also distinct from
much of federal criminal law, which, in addition to prohibiting offenses of
purely national concern such as treason or counterfeiting, also prohibits
“traditional” criminal activity when that activity transcends state
boundaries. As used in this article, the term white collar crime refers
exclusively to the class of federal offenses designed to police business
behavior that do not fit within these categories.
The distinction between ordinary and white collar criminal law is
perhaps best illustrated by a comparison of what constitutes fraudulent
behavior under each. State law criminalizes fraudulent conduct when it
amounts to larceny by false pretenses.8 To establish the offense of false
pretenses, “the prosecutor was required to prove that defendant obtained
title or possession of money or personal property of another by means of an
intentional false statement concerning a material fact upon which the
victim relied in parting with the property.”9 False pretenses criminalizes
dishonest behavior only when it is intended to and effective in obtaining
property on the basis of a representation of fact that is known to be false
upon which the other party actually relies.10 This is a fairly strict set of
requirements that punishes dishonesty only when it causes significant harm
to others. The epitome of white collar criminal law, on the other hand, is
the federal mail fraud statute.11 To establish the offense of mail fraud, the
8. E.g., M.G.L.A. 266 § 30 (2004) (Larceny; General Provisions and Penalties); MD.
CODE ANN., [CRIM. LAW] § 7-109 (2004) (Crimes Including Theft); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2178 (2004) (False Pretences); W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24 (2004) (Crimes Against Property).
9. People v. Drake, 462 N.E.2d 376, 377 (N.Y. 1984).
10. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 957 (4th ed. 2003) (explaining that “[f]alse
pretenses, a statutory crime, although defined in slightly different ways in the various
jurisdictions, consists in most jurisdictions of five elements: (1) a false representation of a
material present or past fact (2) which causes the victim (3) to pass title to (4) his property to
the wrongdoer, (5) who (a) knows his representation to be false and (b) intends thereby to
defraud the victim.”); HOWARD G. LEVENTHAL, 1 CHARGES TO THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO
CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW YORK § 50:2 (2004) (noting that the “elements of proof
required to establish larceny by false pretenses are: (a) criminal intent to deprive the owner
of property; (b) that defendant made a false representation of a past or existing fact; (c) that
defendant knew the representation was false when made; (d) that defendant obtained
property of another; and (e) that the representation was believed and relied on by the person
to whom made and that person was in whole or in part induced thereby to give his property
to the defendant.”).
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2004).
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prosecution must establish only that the defendant intentionally participated
in a scheme or artifice to defraud that involves use of the mail or private
carrier service.12 This statute criminalizes dishonest behavior intended to
deprive others of property or the intangible right to another’s honest
services13 on the basis of a false representation or promise, regardless of
whether anyone actually relies on the representation or promise or is
deprived of property or honest services.14 These broad provisions
authorize the punishment of almost any kind of dishonest or deceptive
behavior, even when no other party has suffered any harm. Thus, mail
fraud charges have been brought against a developer for attempting to sell
homes by falsely claiming that they were good investments15 and against a
physician for referring patients to a hospital without disclosing to the
patients that the hospital paid him a fee for the referrals.16
The mail fraud statute is typical of white collar crime in that it empowers
the federal government to police dishonest conduct that is otherwise
beyond the scope of traditional criminal law. Other offenses that share this
feature and thus fall within the white collar crime category include general
offenses such as wire, bank, and securities fraud, and Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act violations, specific offenses that
involve a violation of federal regulations, and subsidiary offenses such as
money laundering, making false statements to federal investigators, and
obstruction of justice. For purposes of this article, this is the realm of white
collar crime.
B. The Evolution of White Collar Criminal Law
1.

Problems of enforcement
Both the substantive and procedural rules of “traditional” AngloAmerican criminal law evolved over the course of centuries in the crucible
of the conflict between Parliament and the Crown for power and the
struggle to preserve the “rights of Englishmen” against the prerogatives of
the King. This is not the place to retell this tale other than to observe that
by the beginning of the twentieth century, the process had produced a body
12. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1168 (11th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he Government must prove that the defendants ‘(1) intentionally participated in a
scheme or artifice to defraud and (2) used the United States mails to carry out that scheme
or artifice.’”).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (defining the terms “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” in the
Code).
14. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1999) (holding that “[t]he commonlaw requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages,’ for example, plainly have no place
in the federal fraud statutes.”).
15. See United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996).
16. See United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996).
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of criminal law that contained many civil libertarian features. Three such
features that resided within the substantive criminal law were the mens rea
requirement, the absence of vicarious criminal liability, and the principle of
legality.
The mens rea requirement limited the state to punishing those who acted
with a “guilty” mind; those who intentionally or recklessly engaged in
prohibited conduct or produced a prohibited consequence.17 This limitation
provided significant protection for individual liberty in two ways. First,
although “[a]cts can occur accidentally, . . . the state of mind that
accompanies one’s act is entirely within the individual’s control. Thus, by
recognizing mens rea as an indispensable element of crimes, we
substantially increase the individual’s power to control his freedom from
punishment.”18 Second, the burden of establishing what was in a
defendant’s mind is often a significant hurdle for the prosecution to
overcome.19
Additional protection for individual liberty arose from permitting
punishment only for an individual’s own actions.20 In the words of a
contemporary commentator, vicarious criminal liability, “by departing from
the ordinary principles of causation and from the fundamental, intensely
personal, basis of criminal liability, violates the most deep-rooted traditions
of criminal law. Vicarious liability is a conception repugnant to every
instinct of the criminal jurist.”21 As a result, “[w]hile the civil courts were.
. . evolving [respondeat superior] during the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. . . in the law of torts, no such development took place in the
criminal law.”22
Another significant substantive protection for liberty was embodied in
17. Actually, criminal culpability required not merely mens rea, but the convergence of
actus reus and mens rea. This meant that the state could punish for neither actions nor
thoughts alone. Like the mens rea requirement, the actus reus requirement serves a civil
libertarian function by preventing the state from pursuing “thought-crimes” and
criminalizing unpopular religious, political or cultural beliefs. Although this feature of the
criminal law is highly relevant in the context of attempt and other inchoate crimes, see, e.g.,
John Hasnas, Once More Unto the Breach: The Inherent Liberalism of the Criminal Law
and Liability for Attempting the Impossible, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57-61 (2002), it is not of
central relevance in the context of white collar crime.
18. Arnold N. Enker, Impossibility in Criminal Attempts—Legality and the Legal
Process, 53 MINN. L. REV. 665, 668 (1969).
19. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 115 (3d ed. 2001)
(discussing the history of mens rea and the ambiguity inherent in the concept, making it
hard to define and prove).
20. One could, of course, be prosecuted as an accomplice, but that was for one’s own
actions in aiding or abetting another’s criminal activity.
21. Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another: Development of
the Doctrine Respondeat Superior, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930).
22. Id. at 694. The possible exceptions to this rule in England were criminal nuisance
and libel. However, neither of these applied in the United States. LAFAVE, supra note 10,
at 695 n.5.
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the principle of legality. Frequently encapsulated in the Latin phrase,
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime or punishment
without law), the principle of legality holds that “conduct is not criminal
unless forbidden by law which gives advance warning that such conduct is
criminal.”23 The principle is operationalized in the form of four corollaries:
(1) a ban on retroactive criminal lawmaking; (2) a ban on the judicial
creation of new common law crimes; (3) a requirement that a criminal
offense is clearly enough defined to give citizens adequate notice of what
conduct is prohibited and to establish clear guidelines governing law
enforcement; and (4) a requirement that the language of a criminal offense
be strictly construed in favor of the defendant (the rule of lenity).24 All
four corollaries “are reflective of the central values of liberal societies”25 in
that they serve to ensure that “people are entitled to know what they are
forbidden to do so that they may shape their conduct accordingly . . . [and]
to eliminate the oppressive and arbitrary exercise of official discretion.”26
The latter two corollaries, which are the ones of concern in the present
context, place significant limits on both the breadth of the criminal statutes
that the legislature may enact and the range of application of those that are
duly enacted.
Many procedural protections for liberty also evolved. The most famous
of these are the twin requirements that the accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty, and that the state must establish the accused’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence means that the
innocence of the defendant is assumed and that the state bears the burden of
introducing evidence sufficient to establish every element of a criminal
offense.27 The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt sets the bar
that the state must surmount to establish these elements exceedingly high.
Taken together, these requirements make it quite difficult for the state to
deprive a citizen of his or her liberty or property. This reflects the inherent
liberalism of Anglo-American criminal law that was captured by
Blackstone in his oft-quoted statement that “the law holds, that it is better

23. LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 11; see also JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
CRIMINAL LAW 28 (2d ed. 1960) (stating that conduct is only criminal if it is described in
criminal law); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 575 (2d ed.
1961) (defining the principle of legality as the concept that crime and punishment must be in
accordance with the law).
24. See LAFAVE, supra note 10, at 11 (illuminating these four collieries and their effect
on American laws); see also DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 39-40 (describing in detail the
principle of nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege).
25. DRESSLER, supra note 19, at 39.
26. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 80 (1968).
27. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (2004) (stating that “[n]o person may be
convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.”).
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that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer,”28 and echoed
in the Supreme Court’s declarations that “[t]he principle that there is a
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law,
axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law”29 and that,
use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal
law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted
by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper fact finder of his guilt with utmost certainty.30

Other procedural safeguards evolved as well, two of which—the
common law attorney-client privilege,31 and the Fifth Amendment right not
to be compelled to be a witness against oneself32—are particularly relevant
to the present consideration. Both of these provisions protect individual
liberty by creating obstacles to criminal conviction. Both place accurate
and potentially incriminating information beyond the reach of the
prosecutor. The former creates a zone of privacy within which citizens
may impart information to their counsel for the purpose of receiving legal
advice without thereby manufacturing evidence against themselves. The
latter ensures that the state honor the requirement of the presumption of
innocence by “forc[ing] the government not only to establish its case, but to
do so by its own resources. It prohibits the state from easing its burden of
proof by simply calling the defendant as its witness and forcing him to
make the prosecution’s case.”33 By placing the techniques of the
Inquisition and the Star Chamber beyond the reach of the state, the right
against self-incrimination embodies the most significant protection of
individual liberty bequeathed to us by the common law.34
28. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 352 (1765).
29. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895).
30. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Other procedural features such as the
right to trial by a jury in which conviction requires a unanimous verdict further reinforce the
liberal bias of the criminal law. Id.
31. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (describing the
attorney-client privilege as one of the oldest recognized rights).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
33. JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 26 (1985).
34. See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION 332 (1986) (Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
The right implied a humane or ethical standard in judging a person accused of
crime, regardless how heinous the crime or strong the evidence of his guilt. It
reflected consideration for the human personality in that respect, but it also
reflected the view that society benefited by seeking his conviction without the aid
of his involuntary admissions. Forcing self-incrimination was thought not only to
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These seven features—(1) the mens rea requirement, (2) the absence of
vicarious criminal liability, (3) the principle of legality, (4) the presumption
of innocence, (5) the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, (6) the
attorney-client privilege, and (7) the privilege against self-incrimination—
reflect the inherent liberalism of American criminal law at the dawn of the
twentieth century. This liberalism, which bestowed the benefit of
protection against governmental overreaching upon citizens, was not
without cost, however. By making it more difficult for the prosecution to
obtain convictions, the liberal features of the criminal law reduced its
deterrent value and thereby reduced its effectiveness in suppressing crime.
Thus, Anglo-American criminal law purchased citizens’ protection against
erroneous or abusive governmental action at the cost of citizens’ reduced
protection against the criminal activity of their fellows.
In the context of white collar crime, the cost imposed by the liberal
features of the criminal law is especially high. To see why, imagine what
the position of a federal prosecutor charged with combating white collar
crime would be if he or she were burdened with the substantive and
procedural safeguards of the traditional criminal law. First, consider the
effect that the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof
beyond reasonable doubt would have on his or her efforts. Like all realworld prosecutors, our imaginary one would be acutely aware of the
limitations on his or her investigative and prosecutorial resources. Policing
all of the business concerns in the United States not only for honest
dealing, but for compliance with the myriad regulations that carry criminal
penalties is a truly monumental task. No matter how large the DOJ’s
budget for white collar crime may be, it would still be insufficient to
address anything beyond the tip of the iceberg of potential offenses.
Furthermore, white collar crime typically consists of deceptive behavior.
There is usually no corpus delicti or smoking gun to introduce into
evidence. White collar criminal activity is intentionally designed to be
indistinguishable from non-criminal activity. As a result, considerable
investigation may be required merely to establish that a crime has been
committed. Even then, unraveling the deception may require a great deal
of legal and/or accounting sophistication. Under these circumstances,
brutalize the system of criminal justice but to produce weak and untrustworthy
evidence.
Above all, the right was most closely linked to freedom of religion and speech . . . .
In the broadest sense it was a protection not of the guilty, or of the innocent, but of
freedom of expression, of political liberty, of the right to worship as one pleased.
In sum, its subtle and slow emergence in English law was, in the words of Dean
Erwin N. Griswold, “one of the great landmarks of man’s struggle to make himself
civilized,” “an expression of the moral striving of the community,” and “an everpresent reminder of our belief in the importance of the individual.”
Id. (quoting ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE 5TH AMENDMENT TODAY; THREE SPEECHES 1 (1955)).
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compliance with procedural rules that require “the government not only to
establish its case, but to do so by its own resources”35 can be an extremely
expensive proposition. The assets that our imaginary prosecutor must
expend to satisfy such liberal safeguards in each case he or she brings
greatly reduce the total number of cases he or she can afford to bring. This,
in turn, significantly reduces the deterrent value of the statutes he or she is
charged with enforcing. Thus, in the context of white collar crime, the law
enforcement costs of the presumption of innocence and requirement of
proof beyond reasonable doubt are inordinately high.
Next, consider the burden the mens rea requirement places on our
prosecutor in the absence of vicarious criminal liability. Without vicarious
liability, he or she could only prosecute individuals for offenses they
personally commit. Thus, in order to obtain a conviction, the prosecutor
would have to establish that the individual defendant acted with the
requisite mens rea, which means proving that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly engaged in or authorized dishonest business practices or the
violation of regulations. When an individual acts alone or with a small
number of confederates, this requirement may not present an inordinate
problem. In the corporate context, however, evidence of mens rea can be
difficult, and in some cases impossible, to obtain. It is in the nature of the
corporate form to diffuse decision-making responsibility. Decisions made
by one member of a firm may not be fully informed by what other
members of the firm are doing or have decided. As the courts have noted,
“[c]orporations compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of
specific duties and operations into smaller components.”36 Further,
corporations frequently take actions that were never explicitly known to, or
authorized by, any identifiable individual or individuals within the firm.
“Complex business structures, characterized by decentralization and
delegation of authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business
purposes, make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents
responsible for . . . violations.”37 Accordingly, without vicarious criminal
liability, the mens rea requirement will often present our hypothetical
prosecutor with an insurmountable barrier to successful prosecutions.
The principle of legality can also pose special problems for our
prosecutor’s efforts. Legality requires both that criminal offenses be
defined clearly enough to give citizens adequate warning of what conduct
is prohibited, and that criminal statutes be narrowly construed. The
problem this causes is that the more definite the law is as to what conduct is
prohibited, the more guidance it provides to what former Chief Justice
35. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26.
36. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
37. United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
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Burger referred to as “the ever-inventive American ‘con artist’”38 to come
up with “new varieties of fraud”39 that are not technically illegal. Further,
because the rule of lenity requires the narrow construction of criminal
statutes, it creates loopholes in the fabric of the law against deceptive and
fraudulent conduct through which these con artists can squeeze dishonest
practices.40 This results in a running battle between those who would
exploit the loopholes and Congress, which must continually pass new
specific legislation to close them.41 Meanwhile, many forms of dishonest
or deceptive behavior would remain beyond the reach of our imaginary
prosecutor.
The greatest challenge our prosecutor would face, however, is likely to
be presented by the attorney-client privilege and the right against selfincrimination. As noted above, because white collar crime consists
primarily of crimes of deception,42 the type of physical evidence associated
with traditional criminal activity is rarely available. The evidence upon
which conviction for a white collar offense must rest will be almost entirely
documentary in nature, and will consist predominantly of the business
records of the firm for which the defendant works. But to the extent that
these records are in the personal possession of the defendant, contain
communications between the defendant or other members of the firm and
corporate counsel, or are the work product of corporate counsel, the right
against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege render them
unavailable to the prosecution. To a much greater extent than is the case
with regard to traditional criminal activity, the evidence necessary for a
conviction for a white collar criminal offense will be in the hands of those
who cannot be compelled to produce it. This once again places our
beleaguered prosecutor in an unenviable position.
Viewed from the perspective of the early Twentieth Century, then, these
four problems—limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, the
difficulty of establishing mens rea, the loopholes created by narrowly
construed statutes, and the difficulty of obtaining necessary documentary
evidence—would constitute the chief impediments to the effective
enforcement of white collar criminal statutes. For the federal government
to mount a successful campaign to suppress such crime, the criminal law
would have to evolve ways to overcome these problems. And this is
38. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 406 (commenting on how the Mail Fraud Statute is a stop-gap for new
criminal activity, giving time for Congress to develop new laws for new types of fraud).
41. See id. at 405-08 (mentioning the burden placed on Congress to enact laws quickly
enough to counteract new types of white collar crime).
42. See HAZEL CROALL, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 1 (Mike Maguire ed.,
2001).
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precisely what happened. To overcome the problem of limited police
resources, the law evolved so as to conscript businesses and business
people into the role of deputy law enforcement agents. To overcome the
difficulty of establishing mens rea, the law evolved to allow punishment in
the absence of proof of intentional wrongdoing by specific individuals. To
overcome the problem of statutory loopholes, the law evolved broader,
inchoate versions of traditional offenses and entirely new “secondary”
offenses.43 And to overcome the difficulty of obtaining necessary
documentary evidence, the law evolved mechanisms for circumventing
common law and constitutional privileges.
There were three main vehicles for the evolution of these solutions:
(1) the concept of corporate criminal responsibility; (2) the legislative
creation of new offenses; and (3) the United States Sentencing
Commission’s Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations.44 Hence, let us
examine each of them in turn.
2.

The solutions
a.

Corporate criminal responsibility

Corporations, like all businesses, are abstract entities. They have no
minds in which to form intentions, no hearts in which to conceive a guilty
will, and no bodies that can be imprisoned or corporeally punished in
response to bad behavior. They have no actual existence apart from the
human beings of which they are comprised. How then can corporations be
subject to criminal punishment in contradistinction to (and often in addition
to) their individual members? How can there be corporate as opposed to
individual criminal responsibility?
This was the question confronting the Supreme Court in 1909, when it
decided New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States.45
In that case, an assistant manager of the railroad company had given illegal
rebates in contravention of the Elkins Act.46 Both the manager and the
railroad company were convicted of violating the Act.47 The railroad
appealed its conviction, arguing that holding the corporation liable both
violated the presumption of innocence of the directors and shareholders of

43. By secondary offenses, I mean offenses such as money laundering, 18 U.S.C. §§
1956-1967 (2004), obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, and false
statements, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, that consist of conduct that makes it more difficult for the
government to succeed in the prosecution of other, substantive offenses.
44. U.S.C.G., supra note 1, ch. 8.
45. 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
46. 49 U.S.C. §§ 41-43 (1976), repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-473, 92 Stat. 1466, 1467-70
(1978).
47. New York Central, 212 U.S. at 492.
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the company, and improperly imposed vicarious criminal liability on the
shareholders who were innocent of wrongdoing.48 In addressing these
contentions, the Court recognized that under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, corporations could be held liable in tort for the actions of their
agents taken within the scope of their employment.49 The Court found that
such vicarious liability was justified not “because the principal actually
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is done for the
benefit of the principal . . . and justice requires that the latter shall be held
responsible for damages to the individual who has suffered by such
conduct.”50 The Court then proceeded to “go only a step farther” and, “in
the interest of public policy,” permit corporations to be held criminally
liable for the actions of their agents as well.51 The Court was quite explicit
in identifying the public policy interest that required such an expansion of
the doctrine of respondeat superior, declaring that if “corporations may not
be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of
their agents, . . . many offenses might go unpunished.”52 Thus,
[w]hile the law should have regard to the rights of all, and to those of
corporations no less than to those of individuals, it cannot shut its eyes to
the fact that the great majority of business transactions in modern times
are conducted through these bodies, and particularly that interstate
commerce is almost entirely in their hands, and to give them immunity
from all punishment because of the old and exploded doctrine that a
corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take away the only
means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the
abuses aimed at.53

This constitutes a fairly direct statement that the reason the liberal
protections of the presumption of innocence and the ban on vicarious
criminal liability must be overridden is that, otherwise, federal statutes
aimed at the suppression of white collar crime would be unenforceable.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the same rationale sixty-one
years later when it decided United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp.54 In that
case, one of the hotel chain’s purchasing agents threatened to withhold the
hotel’s business from a supplier in contravention of the Sherman Act55
despite such action being against the hotel’s official policy and despite the
purchasing agent having been given explicit instructions not to engage in
48. Id.
49. Id. at 493.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 494.
52. Id. at 494-95.
53. Id. at 495-96.
54. 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (prohibiting contracts or conspiracies to restrain interstate
commerce or trade).
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such conduct.56 The court nevertheless held the corporation liable “for the
acts of its agents in the scope of their employment, even though contrary to
general corporate policy and express instructions to the agent.”57 The court
justified this apparently inescapable form of vicarious liability on the
ground that,
[c]omplex business structures, characterized by decentralization and
delegation of authority, commonly adopted by corporations for business
purposes, make it difficult to identify the particular corporate agents
responsible for Sherman Act violations. . . .
In sum, identification of the particular agents responsible for a Sherman
Act violation is especially difficult, and their conviction and punishment
is peculiarly ineffective as a deterrent. At the same time, conviction and
punishment of the business entity itself is likely to be both appropriate
and effective.58

Once again, this constitutes a rather frank admission that vicarious criminal
liability is necessary for the effective enforcement of federal statutes
designed to regulate business behavior.
Although corporations are thus criminally responsible for the actions of
all of their employees taken within the scope of their employment,
corporate criminal responsibility is not limited to such cases. As pointed
out in United States v. Bank of New England,59 corporations are also
criminally responsible for the collective actions of all of their employees.60
In Bank of New England, the bank was convicted of violating the Currency
Transaction Reporting Act61 for failing to file the required reports when
one of the bank’s customers made several withdrawals that collectively
totaled more than $10,000.62 The bank appealed a jury instruction equating
the bank’s knowledge with “the sum of the knowledge of all of the
employees.”63 The trial judge instructed the jury that,
if Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B
knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them
all. So if you find that an employee within the scope of his employment
knew that CTRs had to be filed, even if multiple checks are used, the
56. See Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d at 1004 (adding that the purchasing agent’s decision to
violate Hilton Hotel’s policy resulted from “anger and personal pique toward the individual
representing the supplier.”).
57. Id. at 1007.
58. Id. at 1006.
59. 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 855.
61. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2001).
62. See Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 846 (summarizing the bank’s conviction of
thirty-one violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act, which requires a bank to
file a Currency Transaction Report within fifteen days of customer transactions greater than
$10,000).
63. Id. at 855 (quoting the trial judge’s explanation of collective knowledge).
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bank is deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to know it if each of
several employees knew a part of that requirement and the sum of what
the separate employees knew amounted to knowledge that such a
requirement existed.64

The court upheld this instruction as proper stating,
A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context
of corporate criminal liability. The acts of a corporation are, after all,
simply the acts of all of its employees operating within the scope of their
employment. . . .
Corporations compartmentalize knowledge,
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller
components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the
corporation’s knowledge of a particular operation. It is irrelevant
whether employees administering one component of an operation know
the specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the
operation . . . . [“T]he corporation is considered to have acquired the
collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible for their
failure to act accordingly.[”]65

Therefore, a corporation can be guilty of an offense even though no
individual member of the firm has committed any crime. Such a result is
difficult to explain on any basis other than the absolute necessity of
vicarious criminal liability to the effectiveness of the regulatory legislation.
Consider the extent to which this conception of corporate criminal
responsibility solves our hypothetical prosecutor’s problems. In the first
place, it eases his or her struggle with limited resources by shifting a
significant portion of the cost of crime prevention from the government to
the corporations themselves. Under the rules of New York Central and
Hilton Hotels, the only way for a firm to avoid criminal liability is to
constantly monitor the behavior of all of its employees to ensure that none
of them intentionally or recklessly violates the law.66 Actual monitoring is
required because merely having corporate policies or issuing explicit
instructions against violating the law is not sufficient to protect the firm
from conviction. Further, under the rule of Bank of New England, firms
must continually review all corporate activities to ensure that no laws are
unintentionally violated as a result of the ill-informed or poorlycoordinated actions of the companies’ various employees. Thus, this
conception of corporate criminal responsibility goes a long way toward
enlisting corporations as deputy law enforcement agencies.
This form of corporate criminal responsibility also helps the prosecutor
64. Id.
65. Id. at 856 (quoting United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738
(W.D. W. Va. 1974)).
66. Actually, the corporation is often required to ensure that none of its employees
negligently breaks the law as well. See infra text accompanying notes 117-120.
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overcome the problem posed by the mens rea requirement. Even under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the prosecutor would still have to present
evidence proving that at least one employee intentionally or recklessly
violated the law—something that can be difficult to do in the corporate
context.67 But Bank of New England’s collective knowledge doctrine frees
the prosecutor from this constraint. Because the corporation will be
deemed to have the sum total of the knowledge of all of its employees, the
prosecutor need only prove that it was possible for the corporation to
assemble the required knowledge to establish corporate mens rea. As a
scienter requirement, this borders on the oxymoronic since it implies that a
company that not only does not have knowledge in fact, but is not even
negligent in failing to assemble it, can nevertheless act knowingly. But it
has the prosecutorial virtue of converting unintentional individual conduct
into intentional corporate conduct. Thus, by relieving the prosecutor of the
burden of proving intent, this conception of corporate criminal
responsibility eliminates one of the major hurdles to the successful
prosecution of white collar offenses.
Finally, the ability to hold business vicariously liable for the offenses of
their employees helps our prosecutor overcome the impediment that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination poses to his or her
efforts to obtain evidence. To see how, consider that in the 1906 case of
Hale v. Henkel,68 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege did not apply to corporations. This was a perfectly sensible
decision at the time since, coming as it did three years before New York
Central, corporations were not subject to criminal punishment. After all,
what would be the point in holding that an entity that could not be
prosecuted had a right against self-incrimination? The situation changed
when, three years later, corporations became liable to the criminal sanction.
The point of extending the Fifth Amendment privilege to corporations then
became precisely the same as it is with regard to individuals, to preserve
the liberal character of the criminal law embodied in the presumption of
innocence that “prohibits the state from easing its burden of proof by
simply calling the defendant as its witness and forcing him to make the
prosecution’s case.”69 The Court, however, never revisited the issue with
this in mind, but simply continued to cite Hale for what became known as
the collective entity rule—the proposition that “for purposes of the Fifth
67. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
68. 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (stating, “[W]e are of the opinion that there is a clear
distinction in this particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the latter has
no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination at the suit of the
state.”); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 105 (1988) (explaining that “Hale
settled that a corporation has no Fifth Amendment privilege.”).
69. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26.
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Amendment, corporations and other collective entities are treated
differently from individuals.”70
The advent of corporate criminal responsibility, then, created a new class
of defendant shorn of the right against self-incrimination. This was a boon
to white collar prosecutors in two ways. First, in cases against corporate
defendants, prosecutors could subpoena whatever documentary evidence
they desired without fear that the subpoena would be resisted on Fifth
Amendment grounds. Second, in cases against individual defendants
employed by corporations or other collective entities, prosecutors could
circumvent the defendants’ personal Fifth Amendment rights by issuing
subpoenas to them in their corporate capacity. That is, by issuing a
subpoena to John Doe, Employee of ABC Corporation, rather than merely
to John Doe in his personal capacity, prosecutors could compel an
individual to produce corporate documents that would be used as evidence
against him personally. As the Court explained, “[t]he plain mandate of
these decisions is that without regard to whether the subpoena is addressed
to the corporation, or . . . to the individual in his capacity as a custodian, a
corporate custodian . . . may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on
Fifth Amendment grounds.”71 Indeed, the Court was quite explicit that the
rationale for thus limiting the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege was
that it was necessary for the effective enforcement of the statutes directed
against white collar crime.
We note further that recognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf
of the records custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental
impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute “white-collar crime,”
one of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement
authorities. “The greater portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an
organization or its representatives is usually found in the official records
and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to
be thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective
enforcement of many federal and state laws would be impossible.”72

There should be nothing surprising about the evolution of corporate
70. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
71. Id. at 108-09.
72. Id. at 115. Ironically, in the earlier case of Bellis v. United States, the Court
justified its refusal to allow individuals to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege with
respect to corporate documents on the grounds that “recognition of the individual’s claim of
privilege with respect to the financial records of the organization would substantially
undermine the unchallenged rule that the organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth
Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such
organizations.” 417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974). Thus, the very existence of the theoretically
ungrounded collective entity rule is offered as a justification for denying individuals the
protection of the right against self-incrimination, as is the fact that if it is not curtailed, the
right would effectively perform its intended function of limiting the means by which the
government may exercise its regulatory power.

10/3/2005 1:33 PM

HASNAS

600

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:579

criminal responsibility, and I am certainly not suggesting that there was any
nefarious agency at work in its development. Rather, the current
conception of corporate criminal responsibility should be seen as the
logical outgrowth of the effort to police the business environment for
honest dealing and regulatory violations. For the federal government to
wage a successful campaign against white collar crime, it had to find a way
to circumvent the civil libertarian features inherent in the traditional
criminal law. The conception of corporate criminal responsibility that
arose in the context of that campaign is well-designed to serve that end. It
reverses the presumption of innocence by conclusively presuming the firm
to be guilty not only of any crime committed by its individual employees in
the scope of their employment, but also of any crime that could have been
committed if the firm had assembled the requisite collective knowledge,
whether or not it did so. This advances the campaign against white collar
crime by shifting a large amount of the costs of both crime prevention and
investigation from the government to businesses, which can now avoid
criminal liability only by continually monitoring the behavior of its
individual employees and by auditing the diverse particles of information
possessed by each. Corporate criminal responsibility also eliminates the
burden of establishing corporate mens rea in the form of a collective,
corporate intention to engage in criminal activity by imputing the intention
of any of its agents to the corporation even when the agent is acting
contrary to corporate policy or instructions, and by converting the
unintentional and uncoordinated actions of the firm’s individual employees
into the intentional action of the firm. And finally, because businesses
have no Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, corporate
criminal responsibility opens the door to evidence that would otherwise be
constitutionally unavailable to prosecutors.
b.

New offenses

Even with the advantages of corporate criminal responsibility, a federal
prosecutor engaged in the campaign against white collar crime would still
face an uphill battle. Traditional criminal law required that criminal
offenses be defined with sufficient clarity to put the ordinary person on
notice as to what conduct was prohibited. But in the context of white collar
crime, which consists primarily of crimes of deception, such clarity would
instruct criminals in the best way to skirt the law. In such cases, proving
every element of an offense, especially mens rea, beyond reasonable doubt
would be a very arduous task. To wage a successful war on white collar
crime, a federal prosecutor would need more weapons than the criminal
law traditionally provides.
These weapons arrived in the form of the legislative creation and
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expansive judicial interpretation of new criminal offenses.73 Specifically,
Congress passed, and the federal courts endorsed, criminal statutes creating
offenses of broad scope, or with reduced mens rea requirements, or that
consisted entirely of actions that make it more difficult for the government
to prosecute other substantive offenses. Each of these types of new offense
made the life of a federal prosecutor considerably easier.
Consider first the broadly-defined substantive offenses, of which the
various federal fraud statutes and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO),74 can serve as useful examples. Mail fraud,75
which is probably the archetypical white collar criminal offense, has
already been mentioned.76 The traditional conception of criminal fraud
consisted of one party obtaining the property of another on the basis of an
intentional misrepresentation of a material fact upon which the victim
relied.77 This required the prosecution to establish that: (1) the defendant
had obtained the property of another; (2) the defendant had knowingly
made a false representation of fact; (3) the fact was material; and (4) the
victim relied on the false representation in transferring the property. The
federal mail fraud statute, in contrast, consists of any scheme or artifice to
defraud that involves the use of the mails. To establish a scheme or artifice
to defraud, the prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant
participated in “any deliberate plan of action or course of conduct by which
someone intends to deceive or to cheat another of something of value.”78
The prosecution need not prove that the scheme was designed to obtain the
property of another because the statute defines scheme or artifice to defraud
to include “a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services.”79 It need prove neither that the defendant actually
obtained the property of the victim or deprived the victim of the intangible
right of honest services nor that the victim relied on any representation of
the defendant because “[b]y prohibiting the ‘scheme to defraud,’ rather
than the completed fraud, the elements of reliance and damage would
73. It has been noted, for example, that “[d]uring the past century, both Congress and
the Supreme Court have repeatedly placed their stamps of approval on expansive use of the
mail fraud statute. Indeed, each of the five legislative revisions of the statute has served to
enlarge its coverage.” Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L.
REV. 771, 772 (1980).
74. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963 (2003).
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346 (2002).
76. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text (explaining the requirements for the
crime of mail fraud and its implications in practice). The comments that follow should be
understood as applying to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344,
health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and securities fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, as well as to
mail fraud. The requirement of a scheme or artifice to defraud is common to them all.
77. See supra note 10.
78. KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 47.13
(5th ed. 2000).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
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clearly be inconsistent with the statutes Congress enacted.”80 Thus, “[t]he
common-law requirements of ‘justifiable reliance’ and ‘damages’ . . .
plainly have no place in the federal fraud statutes.”81 And finally, the
prosecution need not prove that there was a misrepresentation of fact
because,
under the mail fraud statute, it is just as unlawful to speak ‘half truths’ or
to omit to state facts necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. The
statements need not be false or fraudulent on their face, and the accused
need not misrepresent any fact, since all that is necessary is that the
scheme be reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence
and comprehension.82

To describe the scope of the mail fraud statute as broad may be a bit of
an understatement. Indeed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently
declared “the potential reach of [the mail fraud statute] is virtually
limitless,”83 pointing out that,
a customer who importunes an employee to allow her to use the
company’s telephone access code to make an important long-distance
telephone call, in the face of a written company policy expressly
prohibiting non-employees from using the access code, could
conceivably fall within the scope of the statute if read literally. So too
could an employee’s use of his company’s letterhead to lend authority to
a letter of complaint mailed to the employee’s landlord in disregard of
the company’s code of conduct prohibiting the use of the company’s
letterhead for non-company business.84

Thus, in addition to the cases already mentioned in which the government
brought mail fraud charges against a developer who falsely claimed its
homes were good investments,85 and a physician who failed to disclose to
his patients that he received a fee for referring them to a hospital,86 it has
80. Neder, 527 U.S. at 25.
81. Id. at 24-25.
82. United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579, 585 (5th 1982). The prosecution must also
establish the use of the mails, but this requires neither that United States mails actually be
used nor that the message sent be false or misleading in any way. The mailing may be sent
either by the Postal Service or by “any private or commercial interstate carrier,” 18 U.S.C. §
1341, and “[i]t is sufficient for the mailing to be ‘incidental to an essential part of the
scheme,’ or ‘a step in the plot.’” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989).
Thus, “‘innocent’ mailings—ones that contain no false information–may supply the mailing
element . . . [and] the Court has found the elements of mail fraud to be satisfied where the
mailings have been routine.” Id. at 715.
83. United States v. Rybicki, 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002).
84. Id.
85. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1996); see supra note 15 and
accompanying text (discussing Brown as an example of the coverage of the mail fraud
statute).
86. United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996); see supra note 16 and
accompanying text (analyzing Jain as an example of the extent of the mail fraud statute).
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also brought charges against a county commissioner who threatened to
distribute a compromising videotape of a candidate for another seat on the
board,87 a man who secretly lobbied his brother—a United States Senator—
on behalf of a corporation,88 and an IRS employee who looked at
confidential tax returns in contravention of IRS policy.89
Perhaps the best illustration of the breadth of the federal fraud statutes is
the recent prosecution of Martha Stewart. Prosecutors charged Stewart
with securities fraud for publicly and falsely asserting her innocence of
trading stocks on non-public information.90 Stewart, who sold her shares of
ImClone stock immediately prior to a sharp decline in its price, publicly
asserted that she did so in response to a pre-established stop-loss order
rather than on the basis of a tip from her broker based on non-public
information.91 Because “Martha Stewart’s reputation, as well as the
likelihood of any criminal or regulatory action against Stewart, were
material to Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. (“MSLO”)
shareholders because of the negative impact that any such action or damage
to her reputation could have on the company which bears her name,”92 the
government charged her with securities fraud for attempting to
stop or at least slow the steady erosion of MSLO’s stock price caused by
investor concerns [by making or causing] to be made a series of false and
misleading public statements during June 2002 regarding her sale of
ImClone stock on December 27, 2001 that concealed that Stewart had
been provided [non-public] information . . . and that Stewart had sold her
ImClone stock while in possession of that information.93

The government brought this indictment against Stewart despite the fact
that it did not charge her with insider trading. Thus, the scope of the
securities fraud statute is sufficiently broad to allow the indictment of high
profile corporate executives for publicly declaring their innocence of
offenses that they are not even charged with committing. From this
example, one can see why the former Chief of Business Frauds Prosecution
for the Southern District of New York would declare that “[t]o federal
prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our Stradivarius,

87. United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 1165 (11th Cir. 1997) (charging
defendant under the mail fraud statute for “depriv[ing] the citizens . . . of Florida of their
intangible right to [the defendant’s] honest services . . . in her capacity as Lee County
Commissioner.”).
88. United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249 (2d Cir. 1994).
89. United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069 (1st Cir. 1997). This case involved a
conviction for wire fraud, rather than mail fraud.
90. Indictment, United States v. Stewart, No. 03 Cr. 717, ¶ 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. June 4,
2003), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb60403 ind.pdf.
91. Id. ¶ 60.
92. Id. ¶ 57.
93. Id. ¶ 60.
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our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart—and our true love.” 94
Similarly, RICO creates federal offenses not known to the common law
that significantly extend the reach of federal prosecutors.
RICO
criminalizes the direct or indirect investment in, acquisition or maintenance
of an interest in, or participation in the affairs of an enterprise that is
engaged in or affects interstate or foreign commerce through a pattern of
racketeering activity, which is defined as the commission of two or more
predicate offenses during a period of ten years.95 It also criminalizes the
conspiracy to engage in such prohibited activity.96 Further, the predicate
offenses constitute an extremely wide array of both state and federal
offenses, including the opened-ended federal fraud statutes just discussed.97
These provisions give federal prosecutors the power to go after virtually
any form of group activity that involves the commission of, or merely the
plans to commit, more than one criminal offense.
In passing RICO, Congress was explicit that the statute’s purpose was to
enhance federal law enforcement power, stating in its findings that it
enacted the statute to remedy
defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the
development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions
and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in
scope and impact.98

Indeed, Congress gave the courts explicit instructions to construe the
statute broadly by including a provision that specifically calls for a liberal
construction of RICO.99 The Supreme Court has heeded these instructions,
stating that “RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of
Congress’ self-consciously expansive language and overall approach, but
also of its express admonition that RICO is to ‘be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes,’”100 Accordingly, the Court held that
RICO’s application was not limited to the efforts of organized crime to
infiltrate legitimate businesses, but may also be used against any

94. Rakoff, supra note 73, at 771.
95. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1962 (2000) (defining “racketeering activity” under the
various RICO provisions, and prohibiting activities defined as racketeering).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (dictating that it is unlawful to conspire to violate RICOprohibited activities).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (defining racketeering activity to include mail fraud, wire
fraud, and financial institution fraud).
98. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923
(1970).
99. See 84 Stat. at 947 (indicating that liberal construction is necessary to serve RICO’s
remedial purpose).
100. See Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
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association of individuals that pursues criminal purposes.101 Thus,
“RICO’s versatility has allowed RICO prosecutions for tax, securities,
commodities, and bankruptcy fraud as well as for obscenity, drug, or
gambling violations.”102
Next, consider the myriad new regulatory offenses that require either no
or a reduced level of mens rea. Traditionally, criminal law required either
intentional or reckless conduct to sustain a conviction for a crime. There
was no strict liability at common law,103 and many jurisdictions did not
permit criminal convictions for negligent behavior.104 Among those that
did, ordinary civil negligence could not sustain a criminal conviction.105 A
more culpable form of negligence, criminal negligence, was required.
Criminal negligence requires that “the negligence of the accused must be
‘culpable,’ ‘gross,’ or ‘reckless,’ that is, the conduct of the accused must be
such a departure from what would be the conduct of an ordinary prudent or
careful man under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a
proper regard for human life, or conduct amounting to an indifference to
the consequences.”106
This situation changed over the course of the Twentieth Century as
Congress enacted regulatory statutes that created criminal offenses
requiring no mens rea, and the courts upheld the legitimacy of these
“public welfare offenses.”107 In doing so, the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress was enacting “increasingly numerous and detailed
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular
industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or

101. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 576 (1981).
102. See Terrance G. Reed, The Defense Case for RICO Reform, 43 VAND. L. REV. 691,
700-01 (1990).
103. The common law did, on occasion, permit “strict liability” with regard to legally
required attendant circumstances when the act the defendant engaged in was inherently
wrong. See Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154 (Crown Cases Reserved 1875). Thus, if
one intentionally had intercourse with a young girl, it was not a defense to a charge of
statutory rape that one did not know she was underage. See People v. Olsen, 685 P.2d 52,
57 (Cal. 1984). However, the fact that neither knowledge nor negligence with regard to an
attendant circumstance was required does not imply the offense was one of strict liability.
The defendant was still required to intentionally produce the prohibited consequence. Thus,
in the case of statutory rape, the defendant had to intentionally engage in the act of
intercourse. Id. at 59.
104. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 911 (Mass. 1944) (noting
that “[t]here is in Massachusetts at common law no such thing as ‘criminal negligence.’”).
105. See State v. Barnett, 63 S.E.2d 57, 58-59 (S.C. 1951).
106. Id. at 59. The Model Penal Code defines criminal negligence as involving a risk “of
such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.”
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
107. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (upholding a statute
punishing public welfare offenses that did not require a criminal intent).
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welfare,”108 the violation of which “impairs the efficiency of controls
deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted.”109 Because,
with regard to such regulations, “whatever the intent of the violator, the
injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to
fortuity,”110 the Court endorsed “construing statutes and regulations which
make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty
act alone makes out the crime.”111 Thus, just as it did in recognizing
corporate criminal responsibility, the Court justified relaxing one of the
liberal features of the traditional criminal law, the mens rea requirement, on
the ground that doing so was necessary to effectively police the business
environment.
Under the public welfare offense doctrine, businesses and individuals
can be criminally punished for entirely innocent regulatory violations, at
least when the potential penalty is relatively small.112 For example, a
company that operated a tank farm near Boston Harbor was convicted of
violating the Refuse Act113 when it allowed oil to seep into a part of Boston
Harbor, despite the fact that the government made no allegation of a lack of
care by the company, and the company “immediately undertook to clean up
the oil and to trace its source . . . [and] worked diligently to divert or drain
the accumulation.”114 Once again, this result was justified on the ground of
law enforcement considerations.115
Merely to attempt to formulate, let alone apply, [a mens rea
requirement,] would be to risk crippling the Refuse Act as an
enforcement tool . . . . [I]t would be difficult indeed, and to no purpose,
for the government to have to take issue with elaborate factual and
theoretical arguments concerning who, why and what went wrong. . . .
In the present circumstances we see no unfairness in predicating liability
on actual non-compliance rather than either intentions or best efforts.116

In addition to public welfare offenses, Congress authorized and the
courts endorsed the imposition of substantial criminal punishment for
regulatory violations resulting from ordinary, as opposed to criminal,
negligence. This development has allowed the criminal prosecution not
108. Id. at 254.
109. Id. at 256.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. (providing that the public welfare doctrine applies where “penalties commonly
are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”).
113. Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 § 13, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1899) (making it illegal to
discharge any type of refuse other than what flows from streets and sewers into any United
States’ “navigable” water).
114. United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 621 (1st Cir. 1974).
115. See id. at 623 (explaining that society receives great benefit from easily defined,
easily enforceable statutes).
116. Id.
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only of employees who are themselves negligent, but also of their
supervisors. Thus, a roadmaster employed by a railway company to
oversee the maintenance and construction of the track was sentenced to six
months in prison, six months in a halfway house, six months of supervised
release, and a $5,000 fine for violating the Clean Water Act117 when a
backhoe operator on his crew negligently pierced an oil pipeline, causing a
discharge of oil into a nearby river.118 The roadmaster, who was charged in
keeping with “the stated policy of prosecutors in the past several
administrations to seek to hold liable the highest level culpable officials of
an entity that commits [white collar] criminal violations,”119 appealed,
arguing that the government had to prove criminal, rather than ordinary,
negligence. The court rejected this argument, noting that “[i]t is well
established that a public welfare statute may subject a person to criminal
liability for his or her ordinary negligence without violating due
process.”120
Finally, consider the recent creation of new “secondary” offenses;
offenses that consist entirely of actions that make it more difficult for the
government to prosecute other substantive criminal offenses.
Traditionally, criminal offenses consisted of actions that either directly
harmed or violated the rights of others, or were immoral in themselves.
But as the campaign against white collar crime evolved, so too did offenses
that consist in conduct that is perfectly innocent in itself, but that impedes
or fails to aid the government’s efforts to prosecute white collar crime.
As a first example, consider currency reporting and money laundering
offenses. Currency reporting offenses consist of the failure of financial
institutions and other covered businesses to report transactions involving
more than $10,000 to the federal government.121 Although there is nothing
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (prohibiting any discharge of oil or other hazardous
material into the water of the United States).
118. United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116, 1119-20, 1126 (9th Cir. 1999).
119. Steven P. Solow & Ronald A. Sarachan, Criminal Negligence Prosecutions Under
the Federal Clean Water Act: A Statistical Analysis and the Evaluation of the Impact of
Hanousek and Hong, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11,153, 11,155 (2002).
120. Hanousek, 176 F.3d at 1121. Although Hanousek is a rather recent decision,
federal prosecutors have long presumed that the intent standard for the Clean Water Act is
simple negligence. Solow & Sarachan, supra note 119, at 11, 159. Further, the courts have
endorsed the prosecution of corporate officials for the ordinary negligence of their
subordinates when those officials are responsible corporate officers. United States v. Hong,
242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001). That is, officers who have the responsibility and
authority to prevent or correct a violation by virtue of their position in the corporation can
be criminally liable for actions of their subordinates. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658,
673-74 (1975).
121. 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (2000) makes it a felony to willfully fail to file required currency
transaction reports (CTRs). 31 U.S.C. § 1313 requires banks and financial institutions to
report transactions of more than $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 1316 requires casinos and persons
moving currency in and out of the country to report transactions or currency movements of
more than $10,000. 26 U.S.C. § 6050I(a) requires all persons receiving more than $10,000
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illegal about engaging in a financial transaction involving more than
$10,000, the government can use this information to help it identify those
who may be engaging in criminal activity. By criminalizing the failure to
report such information to the government, the currency reporting statutes
essentially make it a crime not to aid federal law enforcement efforts.
Federal money laundering statutes criminalize the otherwise legal use of
money obtained through criminal activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 makes it
illegal to engage in any financial transactions with the proceeds of unlawful
activity with the knowledge that the transaction is intended to conceal
information about the funds.122 The courts have interpreted the language of
this statute to mean that purchasing just about anything with money known
to be the proceeds of unlawful activity will constitute a transaction
designed to conceal information about the funds. Thus, in United States v.
Jackson,123 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the money
laundering conviction of an alleged drug dealer for writing checks to
purchase cell phones and pay his rent, and for cashing checks for small
amounts at his local bank.124 18 U.S.C. § 1957 makes it illegal to engage in
monetary transactions of more than $10,000 involving the proceeds of
unlawful activity, regardless of the purpose for which the transaction is
undertaken.125 Several federal circuits have interpreted this statute to cover
the withdrawal of more than $10,000 from any account that contains at
least $10,000 in unlawful proceeds, regardless of how much untainted
money the accounts also contain.126 This provision criminalizes the use of
more than $10,000 of one’s own money, regardless of its source, once it
has been commingled with illegal proceeds. The breadth of this statute is
so great that it had to be amended in 1988 to permit criminal defendants to
pay their attorneys.127 By thus making the otherwise innocent use of illegal
proceeds a criminal offense in itself, the money laundering statutes expand
the range of activities the government may investigate by an order of
magnitude and greatly facilitate the government’s ability to trace suspected
in cash in the course of one’s business to file a report. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 makes it a felony
for anyone to structure his or her financial transactions to avoid federal reporting
requirements.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
123. 935 F.2d 832 (7th Cir. 1991).
124. Id. at 841.
125. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).
126. See United States v. Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the
government does not have to prove that no untainted funds were involved in the transaction
if the transaction originated from a single source of commingled lawful and unlawful
money); see also United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that
if the government was required to prove that no untainted funds were used, individuals
could avoid prosecution by commingling illegitimate and legitimate funds).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f)(1) (indicating that “the term ‘monetary transaction’ . . .
does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a person’s right to representation as
guaranteed by . . . the Constitution.”).
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criminal activity. In essence, these statutes make it a crime to make it more
difficult for the government to detect one’s crimes.128
A second example of the new secondary offenses is the crime of making
false statements to federal investigators. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 makes it a
felony to lie to or otherwise deceptively conceal material information from
officials investigating any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal
government. This offense may be committed whenever an individual
responds to a question from a federal investigator, regardless of whether he
or she is under oath. Under § 1001, it can be a crime simply to deny one’s
guilt of an offense. For example, a union official was convicted not only of
accepting unlawful cash payments, but also of making a false statement for
responding “no” when two FBI agents came to his home and asked him
whether he had received such payments.129 In upholding the official’s
conviction for making a false statement, the Supreme Court was clear about
the breadth of the statute’s application, stating, “[b]y its terms, 18 U.S.C. §
1001 covers “any” false statement–that is, a false statement ‘of whatever
kind.’ The word ‘no’ in response to a question assuredly makes a
‘statement.’” Indeed, in rejecting the union official’s argument that an
exception must be made for an “exculpatory no,” the Court explicitly
recognized the power § 1001 places in the hands of federal prosecutors by
stating,
Petitioner repeats the argument made by many supporters of the
“exculpatory no,” that the doctrine is necessary to eliminate the grave
risk that § 1001 will become an instrument of prosecutorial abuse. The
supposed danger is that overzealous prosecutors will use this provision
as a means of “piling on” offenses—sometimes punishing the denial of
wrongdoing more severely than the wrongdoing itself. The objectors’
principal grievance on this score, however, lies not with the hypothetical
prosecutors but with Congress itself, which has decreed the obstruction
of a legitimate investigation to be a separate offense, and a serious
one.130

A final example of this type of offense can be supplied by the statutes
prohibiting obstruction of justice.131 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1505 prohibit
any efforts to corruptly influence, obstruct or impede any federal judicial or
administrative proceeding or legislative inquiry. In addition, 18 U.S.C. §§
128. The secondary offense, incidentally, often carries a greater penalty than the
underlying substantive offense. See NORMAN ABRAMS & SARAH SUN BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 397-98 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining that the sentence
for money laundering is almost four times greater than for the crime that generates the
unlawful proceeds).
129. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 400 (1998).
130. Id. at 405.
131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1510, 1512, 1519-1520 (listing the various
obstruction of justice offenses).
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1512, 1519, and 1520 prohibit any efforts to corruptly alter, destroy,
mutilate, or conceal documents or other objects that might be relevant to
any official proceeding or investigation of any federal department or
agency. The power and broad reach of these statutes is illustrated by the
recent convictions of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm and Frank
Quattrone, the high-profile investment banker for Credit Suisse First
Boston Corporation (CSFB). Andersen, which was the accounting firm
employed to audit Enron’s books, was never charged with or convicted of
any fraudulent practices or accounting irregularities. Rather, the company
was indicted for corruptly persuading and attempting to persuade its
employees to alter and destroy documents related to a Securities and
Exchange Commission investigation of Enron’s special purpose entities.132
Andersen was convicted of violating § 1512 solely on the basis of in-house
counsel Nancy Temple’s response to a draft memorandum concerning
Andersen’s actions in response to an Enron press release characterizing
certain losses as non-recurring. The obstruction consisted of Temple’s
recommendation to delete “some language that might suggest we have
concluded the release is misleading . . . [when] in fact Andersen had
concluded that the term ‘non-recurring’ was misleading.”133 Similarly,
Quattrone, who was not charged with any substantive fraud, was convicted
on three counts of obstruction of justice and sentenced to eighteen months
in prison for forwarding another employee’s e-mail suggesting that CSFB’s
employees comply with the company’s document retention policy and
“catch up on file cleaning” with the added injunction, “having been a key
witness in a securities litigation case in south texas [sic] i [sic] strongly
advise you to follow these procedures.”134
Clearly, false statements and obstruction of justice are offenses designed
to aid federal law enforcement efforts. Both offenses make it a separate
crime for an individual to do anything that would make it more difficult for
the government to convict that individual or anyone else of another
substantive crime. Neither offense requires, however, that there actually be
any underlying substantive criminal activity. One can be guilty of either
offense without being guilty of anything else, as Martha Stewart’s recent
convictions demonstrate. Stewart was convicted of both false statements

132. Indictment, United States v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, No. H-02-121, 2002 WL
32153945 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2002).
133. Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Andersen’s Motion for a
Judgment of Acquittal or a New Trial, United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP (S.D. Tex.
2002) (Cr. No. H-02-121) in JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR CRIME 458 (2d
ed. 2003).
134. Indictment, United States v. Quattrone, No. 03 Cr., ¶¶ 27-28 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,
2003) (charging Quattrone with obstruction of justice for promoting file destruction),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/csfb/usquattrone 51203ind.pdf.
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and obstruction of justice in connection with statements she made to federal
investigators during a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation
of allegations of insider trading in shares of ImClone Systems Inc. stock.
Stewart was never charged with insider trading, and, in fact, could not be
because she was not an Imclone insider, she was not tipped by such an
insider, and she did not breach any fiduciary duty to the source of the
information, who was her broker and who recommended the trade to her.135
Nevertheless, Stewart was charged with and convicted of making false
statements and obstructing an agency investigation by providing a false
account of the communications she had with her broker concerning the sale
of her stock.136 Thus, these statutes empower prosecutors to go after not
just criminals attempting to avoid detection and punishment, but anyone
who interferes with a federal investigation regardless of the reason.
The creation of these new offenses went a long way toward relieving the
burden that the inherent liberalism of the traditional criminal law would
have otherwise placed on federal prosecutors. In the first place, the
enactment of broadly-defined substantive offenses such as mail and wire
fraud and RICO greatly ameliorated the inconveniences arising from the
principle of legality’s requirement that criminal offenses be definitely
defined and narrowly construed. As a feature of the common law, the
principle of legality may be overridden by statute as long as the legislation
is not unconstitutionally vague. Thus, Congress’ enactment of expansive,
somewhat amorphous new offenses like the federal fraud offenses and
135. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
136. Despite the impression given by press accounts of the verdict, Stewart was not
convicted for lying about whether she sold her Imclone stock pursuant to a stop-loss order.
United States v. Martha Stewart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Specifically,
[t]he jury found Stewart guilty of making the following false statements, each of
which was a specification in Count Three of the Indictment. Stewart told the
Government investigators that she spoke to Bacanovic on December 27 and
instructed him to sell her ImClone shares after he informed her that ImClone was
trading below $60 per share. Stewart also stated that during the same telephone
call, she and Bacanovic discussed the performance of the stock of her own
company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (“MSLO”), and discussed K-Mart.
She told investigators that she had decided to sell her ImClone shares at that time
because she did not want to be bothered during her vacation. Stewart stated that
she did not know if there was any record of a telephone message left by Bacanovic
on December 27 in her assistant’s message log. She also said that since December
28, she had only spoken with Bacanovic once regarding ImClone, and they had
only discussed matters in the public arena. Finally, Stewart told investigators that
since December 28, Bacanovic had told her that Merrill Lynch had been questioned
by the SEC regarding ImClone, but that he did not tell her that he had been
questioned by the SEC or that he had been questioned about her account.
The jury acquitted Stewart of one specification charged in Count Three: her
statement that she and Bacanovic had agreed, at a time when ImClone was trading
at $74 per share, that she would sell her shares when ImClone started trading at $60
per share.
Id.
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RICO, coupled with specific injunctions to the courts to construe the
offenses broadly constituted an effective means for closing the loopholes in
the fabric of white collar criminal law.
This is certainly the way the mail and wire fraud statutes have been used.
As described by former Chief Justice Warren Burger, the mail fraud statute
has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a first line of
defense. When a “new” fraud develops—as constantly happens—the
mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal on a temporary basis
with the new phenomenon, until particularized legislation can be
developed and passed to deal directly with the evil.137

Amplifying this sentiment, one federal prosecutor explained that
the mail fraud statute, together with its lineal descendant, the wire fraud
statute, has been characterized as the “first line of defense” against
virtually every new area of fraud to develop in the United States in the
past century. Its applications, too numerous to catalog, cover not only
the full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds,
insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but have extended even to such
areas as blackmail, counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery. In many
of these and other areas, where legislatures have sometimes been slow to
enact specific prohibitory legislation, the mail fraud statute has
frequently represented the sole instrument of justice that could be
wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of deceit.138

Thus, statutes such as the mail and wire fraud statutes are a manifestation
of Congress’ quest for the ultimate weapon in the battle between con
artists’ efforts to skate along the edge of the law, and the federal
government’s effort to eliminate dishonest or deceptive business practices.
The cost of creating such offenses that are broad enough to reach the full
range of deceptive activity, however, is paid in terms of the failure to
furnish the public with clear notice as to what constitutes criminal conduct
and the lack of definite guidelines to govern law enforcement. Although
the courts have not (or perhaps merely not yet)139 declared the federal fraud
137. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. Rakoff, supra note 73, at 772.
139. See United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) (intimating that the issue may be ripe for consideration by the Supreme Court
because
the vagueness of the statute has induced court after court to undertake a rescue
operation by fashioning something that (if enacted) would withstand a vagueness
challenge. The felt need to do that attests to the constitutional weakness of section
1346 as written. And the result of all these efforts–which has been to create
different prohibitions and offenses in different circuits–confirms that the weakness
is fatal. Judicial invention cannot save a statute from unconstitutional vagueness;
courts should not try to fill out a statute that makes it an offense to “intentionally
cause harm to another,” or to “stray from the straight and narrow,” or to fail to
render “honest services.”).
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statutes to be unconstitutionally vague, many have recognized that they
tread uncomfortably close to the constitutional border. In a recent decision
upholding the mail fraud statute against a vagueness challenge, the Second
Circuit, after admitting that the statute’s meaning was not plain enough on
its face to satisfy the constitutional standard, found the “well-settled
meaning of scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of
honest services”140 to be,
a scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable an officer or
employee of a private entity (or a person in a relationship that gives rise
to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employers)
purporting to act for and in the interests of his or her employer (or of the
other person to whom the duty of loyalty is owed) secretly to act in his or
her or the defendant’s own interests instead, accompanied by a material
misrepresentation made or omission of information disclosed to the
employer or other person.141

But, as the dissent pointed out, this standard “in effect criminalizes all
material acts of dishonesty by employees or by persons who owe analogous
duties,”142 and would thus allow the criminal punishment
of any of the following conduct: a regulated company that employs a
political spouse; an employee who violates an employee code of
conduct; a lawyer who provides sky-box tickets to a client’s general
counsel; a trustee who makes a self-dealing investment that pays off; or
an officeholder who has made a decision in order to please a constituent
or contributor, or to promote re-election, rather than for the public good
(as some prosecutor may see the public good).143

Because “[e]very salaried employee can be said to work for her own
interest while purporting to act in the interests of the employer,”144 and
because “the majority opinion effectively makes ‘dishonesty by an
employee, standing alone, [ ] a crime,’”145 the “well-settled meaning” of the
mail fraud statute appears to place very little limitation on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion. And because the statute can apparently apply to
virtually any form of dishonest or deceptive behavior, it gives the public
very little notice of what the criminal law demands of them beyond a
general injunction to render honest services.
Secondly, the new regulatory offenses mitigated the prosecutor’s burden
of proving mens rea. Intent is typically the most difficult element for a
prosecutor to establish. This is especially true in the corporate environment
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 141-42.
Id. at 164 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
Id. at 161.
Id.
Id.
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with its diffuse responsibility, and is further magnified in cases dealing
with complex regulatory requirements in which proving willful conduct
requires the prosecutor to establish that the defendant knew that he or she
was violating the law.146 Public welfare offenses eliminate this burden
entirely.
Similarly, regulatory offenses that require only ordinary
negligence reduce the burden to relative insignificance, since by permitting
convictions to be based on the violation of an objective, reasonable person
standard, these offenses eliminate the need for the prosecutor to introduce
any evidence of what was actually in the defendant’s mind. Dispensing
with the need to prove intent is a great boon to federal prosecutors in that it
converts the task of applying criminal sanctions to regulatory violations
from one that is virtually impossible to one that is merely difficult. But
once again, this boon does not come without cost. Because “the state of
mind that accompanies one’s act is entirely within the individual’s
control,”147 requiring the government to prove intent “substantially
increase[s] the individual’s power to control his freedom from
punishment.”148 Conversely, dispensing with the need to prove intent
substantially decreases the extent to which individuals can exercise this
power. Thus, the cost of improving prosecutorial efficiency is the
concomitant reduction in the assurance individuals can have that they will
not inadvertently become enmeshed in the coils of the criminal law.
Finally, the new secondary offenses provide prosecutors with a
convenient route around the requirements of the presumption of innocence
and proof beyond reasonable doubt. As has already been noted, obtaining a
conviction for one of the secondary offenses does not require establishing
that the defendant is guilty of any underlying substantive criminal
offense.149 This feature permits prosecutors to use the secondary offenses
as vehicles to punish those whom they suspect, but cannot convict, of
substantive criminal offenses. Consider, for example, the use prosecutors
can make of the money laundering statutes, which typically carry harsher
sentences than most substantive white collar offenses and whose elements
are easier to establish. As two federal prosecutors themselves point out,
[i]n addition to higher sentences in white collar cases, there are other
advantages to federal prosecutors in pursuing money laundering charges
against defendants, including: . . . the ability to prosecute a wrongdoer
when there is either insufficient evidence of the underlying criminal
conduct or insufficient evidence connecting the wrongdoer to the
146. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201-02 (1991) (finding that the willful
conduct requirement of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1982) requires the government to prove the
defendant knew his actions violated the statute).
147. Enker, supra note 18, at 668.
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 134-136.
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underlying criminal conduct . . . . [T]he money laundering statutes allow
prosecutors to prosecute wrongdoers who very probably were involved
in the underlying crime without enough evidence of this involvement to
prosecute it directly. Thus evidence of the underlying crime which may
be insufficient to prove all the elements of the underlying crime may still
be enough to show that a specified unlawful activity occurred—leading
to a money laundering conviction even if the defendant is acquitted of
the underlying crime.150

Indeed, in United States v. Jackson,151 the defendant’s conviction on money
laundering charges was upheld despite the fact that he was acquitted on the
underlying substantive charge of drug trafficking.
The false statements and obstruction of justice statutes can similarly be
used to circumvent the need to prove every element of a substantive
criminal offense beyond reasonable doubt. It is entirely possible that
certain employees of Arthur Andersen did engage in fraudulent activities in
connection with the auditing of Enron’s books and, hence, that Arthur
Andersen itself was guilty of a substantive offense. Bringing such a case,
however, would be an arduous and expensive task. Prosecutors would have
to invest the resources necessary to subpoena and review an extensive
amount of documentation, interview potentially dozens of Andersen and
Enron employees who might invoke their privilege against selfincrimination, unravel a complex scheme of deception disguised to look
like legally proper behavior, and establish either that at least one employee
was acting intentionally in the scope of his or her employment, or that the
partnership had sufficient collective knowledge to be aware that fraud was
taking place. Convicting Arthur Andersen of obstruction of justice, on the
other hand, required the government to prove only that at least one person
in the company attempted to persuade others to alter or destroy a document
or documents that might be sought in connection with an investigation by a
federal agency. Similarly, it is considerably easier to obtain an obstruction
of justice conviction against Frank Quattrone for forwarding a single e-mail
than it is to develop the evidence necessary to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that he was a knowing participant in a fraudulent scheme to charge
higher than usual commissions to hedge funds in return for favorable
allocations of initial public offerings. Finally, in the Martha Stewart case,
the government could not establish the elements of insider trading not for
evidentiary reasons, but because one of the necessary elements of the
150. B. FREDERICK WILLIAMS, JR. & FRANK D. WHITNEY, FEDERAL MONEY LAUNDERING:
CRIMES AND FORFEITURES 14-16 (1999). Other advantages the authors mention include the
ability to introduce potentially prejudicial evidence of wealth and “big spending” at trial and
the ability to avoid the statute of limitations on the underlying offense by charging a
defendant with a recent monetary transaction. Id. at 15.
151. 983 F.2d 757, 766-67 (7th Cir. 1993); see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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offense, that Stewart be an insider or have misappropriated confidential
information, was missing. The prosecution was nevertheless able to
circumvent the impossibility of meeting its burden of proof on the
underlying substantive offense by charging and convicting Stewart of
making false statements to federal investigators and obstructing an agency
investigation.
c.

The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines

The advent of corporate criminal responsibility and the legislative
creation of new white collar offenses considerably eased the burden that the
liberal aspects of traditional criminal law imposed upon federal
prosecutors. Nevertheless, large corporations typically have extensive
resources at their disposal with which to put on a defense, and they can use
those resources to hire the most experienced and sophisticated members of
the white collar criminal defense bar. Thus, to the extent that they are
willing to defend themselves against criminal charges, corporations still
constitute a formidable adversary for federal prosecutors. Anything that
would make corporations less likely to mount such a defense would be a
welcome addition to the prosecutors’ arsenal. Just such an addition arrived
in 1991 in the form of Chapter 8 of the United States Sentencing
Commission’s Guidelines Manual, the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines.152
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are designed to govern the
sentencing of corporate entities convicted of violating federal law. Because
such entities cannot be imprisoned, the Guidelines consist of a schedule of
fines to be levied against corporate violators that are determined on the
basis of the offense committed and the organization’s corporate character
as captured by a “culpability score.” Although the Guidelines are complex,
the aspects that are relevant to our present concerns are reasonably
straightforward.
When an organization is convicted of a federal offense, the fine it must
pay is determined by multiplying a base fine by an amount derived from
the organization’s culpability score.153 The base fine is the greatest of: (1)
the amount assigned to the offense that the organization has committed by
an offense level fine table; (2) the pecuniary gain to the organization from
the offense; or (3) the pecuniary loss from the offense knowingly caused by
the organization.154 The offense level fine table assigns fines ranging from
152. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1991). The recent
amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines became effective on November 1, 2004. See
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, app. C (2004) (amendment 673).
153. Id. § 8C2.7.
154. Id. § 8C2.4(a).
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$5,000 to $72,500,000 to the various federal offenses in proportion to their
severity.155 The resulting base fine “is intended to reflect the intrinsic
seriousness of the underlying offense for which the organization bears
vicarious liability.”156
The organization’s culpability score consists in a number from zero to
ten that is determined by assigning every organization a starting point of
five which is then adjusted upward or downward on the basis of seven
enumerated mitigating or aggravating factors.157 Three of these factors are
of particular relevance to our present consideration. The first is the
aggravating factor for obstructing justice, which adds three points to the
organization’s score if the organization obstructed, attempted to obstruct, or
knowingly failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the obstruction of
justice.158 The second is the mitigating factor for having an effective
compliance program, which deducts three points if the offense occurred
despite an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law.159
And the third is the mitigating factor for cooperation, which deducts five
points
[i]f the organization (A) prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or
government investigation; and (B) within a reasonably prompt time after
becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense to appropriate
governmental authorities, fully cooperated in the investigation, and
clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of
responsibility for its criminal conduct . . . .160

The culpability score that results from this calculation is designed to
encapsulate “the organization’s institutional response to the offense, both
before and after its commission.”161
The organization’s culpability score is associated with minimum and
maximum multipliers whose values range from .05 to 4.00.162 For
example, a culpability score of 0 is assigned a minimum multiplier of .05
and a maximum multiplier of .20, while a culpability score of 10 is
assigned a minimum multiplier of 2.00 and a maximum multiplier of
4.00.163 The base fine is then multiplied by both the minimum and
maximum multiplier to determine the guideline fine range from which the

155. Id. § 8C2.4(d).
156. JED S. RAKOFF ET AL., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
MITIGATION § 1.05[3] (1993).
157. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5.
158. Id. § 8C2.5(e).
159. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
160. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
161. RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 156, § 2.06.
162. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.6.
163. Id.

COMPLIANCE
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judge must assign the organization’s fine.164
A moment’s reflection reveals the overwhelming importance of the
organization’s culpability score, which can reduce the organization’s fine
by 95% or increase it by 400%. This feature creates an almost irresistible
incentive for organizations to achieve the lowest possible score. As a
result, organizations have the strongest possible reasons for seeking to
avoid the three point increase for obstructing justice and to receive the
three and five point reductions for having an effective compliance program
and for cooperation. Consider what achieving this goal requires.
To avoid the enhancement to its culpability score for obstruction of
justice, the organization must not only not obstruct or attempt to obstruct a
federal investigation, it must also not knowingly fail to take reasonable
steps to prevent such obstruction. Therefore, to avoid the enhancement, the
organization must take all reasonable steps to ensure that none of its
employees take actions that can constitute obstruction. But as the
Andersen and Quattrone cases demonstrate, obstruction of justice can
consist of recommending that someone alter, destroy or conceal anything
that may be relevant to a federal investigation.165 It may also consist of
persuading someone not to speak to federal investigators,166 or to assert his
or her Fifth Amendment rights.167 Thus, to avoid the enhancement for
obstruction, organizations must make every reasonable effort both to
preserve anything that can be used as evidence against it, and to ensure that
no one is discouraged from providing such evidence to the government. As
a result, an organization that knowingly allowed its corporate counsel to
advise employees that they are not required to make statements to federal
investigators, or to suggest that they not speak to investigators without
counsel present could, if convicted, receive a greater fine for doing so.
This possibility can significantly raise the risk associated with electing to
mount a vigorous defense to a criminal charge.
To receive the reduction to its culpability score for having an effective
compliance program, the organization must “exercise due diligence to
prevent and detect criminal conduct.”168 Such due diligence requires not
only that the organization undertake the criminal investigative function—
that it engage in “monitoring and auditing [the behavior of its employees]
to detect criminal conduct” and maintain a system “whereby the
164. Id. § 8C2.7.
165. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
166. See United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding
that a jury could find an obstruction of justice where the defendant advised an employee not
to speak with federal investigators).
167. See United States v. Cioffi, 493 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1974); Cole v. United States,
329 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Cortese, 586 F. Supp. 119 (M.D. Pa. 1983).
168. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(a)(1).
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organization’s employees and agents may report or seek guidance
regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of
retribution”169—but to some extent the punitive function as well—that it
impose “appropriate disciplinary measures for engaging in criminal
conduct.”170 In essence, for an organization convicted of a federal offense
to receive a reduced fine for having an effective compliance program, it
must have a program designed to generate precisely the evidence of
criminal wrongdoing on the part of its employees that the government can
use to convict the organization itself. Whether or not this is a reasonable
indication of good corporate character as the Organizational Guidelines
assumes, it is not the type of activity that is necessarily consistent with an
organization’s efforts to vigorously defend itself against criminal charges.
Finally, to receive the all-important five point reduction for cooperation,
the organization must voluntarily disclose its wrongful conduct in a timely
manner, fully cooperate in the government’s investigation of that behavior,
and clearly accept responsibility for its criminal conduct.171 For the
disclosure to be timely, it must be made prior to an imminent threat of
disclosure or government investigation, and within a reasonably prompt
time after the organization becomes aware of the offense.172 This
requirement essentially means as soon as possible because the disclosure is
considered untimely once a government investigation commences, whether
the organization is aware of that investigation or not.173 Full cooperation
requires the organization to cooperate from the inception of the government
investigation and to disclose “all pertinent information known by the
organization,”174 which should include information that “is sufficient for
law enforcement personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense
and the individual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct.”175 Acceptance
of responsibility essentially requires an organization to plead guilty to the
offense charged without putting on a defense. This is because although the
[e]ntry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined
with truthful admission of involvement in the offense and related
conduct ordinarily will constitute significant evidence of affirmative
acceptance of responsibility under subsection (g), . . . [t]his adjustment is
not intended to apply to an organization that puts the government to its
burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of
169. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A), (C).
170. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(6).
171. Id. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
172. Id.
173. See United States v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 924 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that a company’s disclosure of fraud was untimely because the disclosure was
made on the night before the indictment was announced).
174. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12.
175. Id.
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guilt . . . .176

Needless to say, this provision creates a strong disincentive for an
organization to mount a defense to federal charges. Indeed, “under the
Guidelines, the price a defendant pays for exercising its constitutional right
to trial is the preclusion of the possibility of having its culpability score
reduced . . . under Section 8C2.5(g).”177
Significantly, the determination of whether an organization has
cooperated sufficiently to be eligible for the five point reduction in its
culpability score rests with the prosecutors. Because courts will not award
the reduction without a recommendation from the prosecutor, cooperation
is, for all intents and purposes, what prosecutors say it is.178 And, pursuant
to a memorandum issued by Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson
containing the DOJ’s policy on cooperation (hereinafter the Thompson
Memorandum),179 prosecutors frequently say that it is a corporation’s
willingness to waive attorney-client privilege, to refrain from paying its
employees’ legal fees, and to refuse to enter into joint defense agreements
with its employees.180
With regard to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, the Thompson
Memorandum states that:
176. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 13.
177. RAKOFF ET AL., supra note 156, § 4.03[1].
178. See American College of Trial Lawyers, The Erosion of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work Product Doctrine in Federal Criminal Investigations, 41 DUQ. L. REV.
307, 320 (2003); David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On the Brink of A Brave New
World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
147, 154-55 (2000).
179. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Department Components, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guide lines.htm. The Thompson Memorandum is
a slightly revised version of the 1999 memorandum issued by Eric Holder to the same
effect. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to Heads of Department Components and All United States Attorneys, Federal
Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999) (summarizing factors prosecutors should take
into account “in assessing the adequacy of a corporation’s cooperation”), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html.
The
Thompson
Memorandum states the Department of Justice’s policy regarding the decision to charge an
organization with an offense, not its policy regarding the decision to recommend the
cooperation reduction to an organization’s culpability score. Thompson Memorandum,
supra, § II(A). In practice, however, no distinction is made and the same policy is applied to
both decisions. Indeed, with regard to the waiver of attorney-client privilege, the revisions
to the Guidelines explicitly recognize the Department of Justice policy by stating that
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to
a reduction in culpability score under subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (g) unless such
waiver is necessary in order to provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent
information known to the organization.” U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (emphasis
added).
180. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B); see also Zornow & Krakaur,
supra note 178, at 154-56 (arguing that federal prosecutors’ zealous application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have eviscerated the attorney-client privilege and the workproduct doctrine).
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[o]ne factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation’s cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including,
if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work product
protections, both with respect to its internal investigation and with
respect to communications between specific officers, directors and
employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to obtain
statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, without having to
negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements . . . .
[P]rosecutors should consider the willingness of a corporation to waive
such protection when necessary to provide timely and complete
information as one factor in evaluating the corporation’s cooperation.181

Pursuant to this policy, federal prosecutors now routinely require
corporations to waive attorney-client and work product privileges at the
outset of an investigation in order to be regarded as fully cooperating.182
As the Thompson Memorandum makes clear in stating that, “[s]uch
waivers permit the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses,
subjects, and targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or

181. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B).
182. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 154 (stating that “[f]ederal
prosecutors . . . now often insist, even at the outset of an investigation, that corporations turn
over privileged communications, attorney work product, and incriminating statements from
corporate employees as a condition of favorable treatment in the exercise of the prosecutor’s
considerable discretion.”); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed
Revisions to the Organizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 495-96 (2004)
(“Defense lawyers cite what they report to be regular governmental demands that
corporations waive otherwise applicable privileges if they wish to avoid indictment or gain
credit at sentencing for cooperating with the government as the principal impetus for the
‘death’ of corporate privileges. The defense bar clearly believes that federal prosecutors are,
with increasing regularity, demanding that corporations waive the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection as a condition of securing leniency in charging or at
sentencing. According to defense practitioners, ‘[w]aiver of the privilege is now a routine
part of discussing a corporate resolution’ of a criminal investigation.”).
Indeed, Professor O’Sullivan points out:
The Arthur Andersen case may present a cautionary tale. Some argue that “[u]nder
most objective standards, [Arthur Andersen, LLP] did everything in its power to
avoid a prosecution that it knew would be a ‘death penalty’ for the firm,” except
agree to waive the attorney-client privilege. Thus, Andersen reportedly notified the
Justice Department and SEC immediately upon learning of the document
destruction in its Houston office. Andersen was also apparently willing to enter
into a deferred prosecution agreement, “in essence a guilty plea, under which the
government could have appointed a special monitor to oversee compliance with its
new document retention policy and with other reforms to be approved by the DOJ.”
Finally, Andersen also agreed to expel the individuals responsible for the document
destruction and did, of course, fire the head of Andersen’s auditing team for Enron
(and the government’s cooperating witness in Andersen’s criminal trial), David
Duncan. Finally, Andersen “reportedly offered to pay as much as $750 million to
Enron shareholders who had sued Andersen for its role in auditing Enron’s books.”
Despite these efforts, the Department of Justice decided to seek an indictment and
ultimately secured a conviction of the partnership.
Id. at 496 n.30 (citing Laurence A. Urgenson et al., Attorney-Client Privilege: Surviving
Corporate Fraud Scandal, 9 BUS. CRIMES BULL. 1, 6 (2002)).
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immunity agreements,”183 “there is no pretense that the values underlying
these privileges are to be sacrificed for any reason other than to make the
prosecution’s job easier.”184 Accordingly, “[t]he Justice Department does
not merely seek disclosure of contemporaneous legal advice concerning the
underlying conduct at issue in an investigation. It also asks for the ‘factual
internal investigation,’ presumably because access to such attorney work
product is an easy way to obtain evidence that the government formerly
had to generate on its own.”185 Because “[t]he prosecutor can influence the
severity of the sentence . . . by recommending the deduction of cooperation
points from the Guidelines calculation, . . . federal prosecutors can demand
that companies disclose privileged information at the outset of an
investigation, and the client is often left with no rational choice but to
accede.”186
With regard to the payment of employees’ attorney’s fees and entering
into joint defense agreements with employees, the Thompson
Memorandum states that
[a]nother factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the
corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees and agents.
Thus, while cases will differ depending on the circumstances, a
corporation’s promise of support to culpable employees and agents,
either through the advancing of attorneys fees, through retaining the
employees without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing
information to the employees about the government’s investigation
pursuant to a joint defense agreement, may be considered by the
prosecutor in weighing the extent and value of a corporation’s
cooperation.187

Thus, even an organization that waives attorney-client privilege may still
be denied the reduction for cooperating if it advances the legal fees of an
employee the government regards as guilty,188 fails to fire such an
employee, or agrees to cooperate with such an employee in preparing his or
her defense. “Prosecutors have seized upon the new guidelines language
and the Thompson Memorandum’s discussion of privilege waiver and now
183. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B).
184. American College of Trial Lawyers, supra note 178, at 319.
185. Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 178.
186. Id. at 154; see also E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. et al., Cooperation with Government is
a Growing Trend, NAT’L L.J., July 19, 2004, at S2 (suggesting that the increase in
investigation and prosecution of corporate crime evinces a trend in which cooperation “with
the government—not by choice—is often the only road to survival for both corporations and
their executives.”).
187. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B).
188. Interestingly, because the laws of several states require organizations to pay the
legal fees of employees under investigation, the Thompson Memorandum includes a
footnote indicating that payment of legal fees in such cases cannot be regarded as a failure
to cooperate. See id. § 4 n.4.
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regularly take the position that the only way for a company to avoid
indictment is to cooperate, which requires waiving the privilege and not
assisting or protecting employees who are targets.”189 The effect of these
incentives is illustrated by the case of the accounting firm of KPMG, which
is under investigation for tax shelters that it sold to its clients.190 KPMG
is cooperating with the government and refusing to assist partners and
employees whom the government deems as uncooperative. KPMG
refused to pay the legal fees of its partners and employees unless they
agreed to cooperate with the prosecutors, refused to enter joint defense
agreements with its partners, agreed to tell prosecutors which documents
the employees and partners are requesting, and fired or threatened to fire
those employees whom the government indicates are not cooperating.191

As considerations such as these make apparent, the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines provide prosecutors with a powerful tool for
circumventing the inherent liberalism of the criminal law. To begin with,
the Guidelines constitute an extraordinarily effective means of reducing the
strain on the prosecutorial resources that result from having to overcome
the presumption of innocence. There is no need to bear the expense
required to establish every element of an offense beyond reasonable doubt
if the defendant pleads guilty. By increasing the potential cost of taking a
case to trial, the Guidelines discourage organizations from putting on a
defense at all. The increased level of fines that an organization can receive
by going to trial and losing rather than pleading guilty and cooperating can
be so massive (the difference between multiplying the base fine by .05 and
4) that it will usually be economically irrational for the organization to
maintain its innocence. Indeed, the Guidelines can have such a profound
effect on the organization’s bottom line that John Coffee of the Columbia
Law School has declared that “[f]or a general counsel to ignore these
guidelines is professional malpractice.”192 Thus, to the extent that the
Guidelines effectively incentivize organizations to plead guilty, federal
prosecutors are relieved of the burden of overcoming the presumption of
innocence.
But the Guidelines do much more than merely discourage organizations
from mounting a defense to charges brought against it as a corporate entity.
To a great extent, they turn organizations into an auxiliary in the
prosecution of its employees as individuals. The stick of the increase in
culpability score for obstruction of justice and the carrots of the reductions
for compliance programs and cooperation essentially present organizations
189. Barcella, Jr. et al., supra note 186, at S2 (emphasis added).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Michele Galen, Keeping the Long Arm of the Law at Arm’s Length, BUS. WK., Apr.
22, 1991, at 104.
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with a tripartite injunction to: (1) do nothing that would help its employees
defend themselves against criminal charges or discourage them from
cooperating with the government; (2) perform a thorough criminal
investigation of its employees; and (3) turn the results of this investigation
over to the government. Unsurprisingly, given the size of the incentives
involved, business organizations frequently comply with this injunction.
More so than ever before, corporations faced with significant criminal
investigations are cooperating with the government by collecting and
analyzing documents relating to the suspected criminal activity,
interviewing employees, conducting costly and time-consuming internal
investigations and forensic audits, and turning over the results of this
work to the government. . . . In a clear sign that a cooperating company
becomes an arm of the government, a few months ago federal
prosecutors in the Eastern District of New York charged corporate
executives of Computer Associates International Inc. with obstruction of
justice for false statements they made to the company’s outside counsel
during an internal investigation; they pleaded guilty.193

Thus, the Guidelines allow prosecutors to pass the costs of criminal
investigations along to private businesses. In effect, they convert part of
the expense of establishing the guilt of individual white collar criminal
defendants from a charge on the federal budget into a cost of doing
business in the United States. This is a particularly effective way of
avoiding the presumption of innocence’s injunction that “the government
not only . . . establish its case, but [do] so by its own resources.”194
It should not be surprising that the Organizational Guidelines function in
this way. As previously discussed, regardless of the size of the DOJ’s
budget, it would be impossible for the Department to effectively enforce
the laws against white collar crime if it was required to prove every offense
beyond reasonable doubt with its own resources.195 The number of
businesses in the United States is simply too great and the opportunities for
dishonest conduct and regulatory violation too vast for any centralized
agency to be able to effectively police the business environment. The
nature of the conduct that is criminalized by the white collar offenses
implies that effective enforcement requires that businesses be made to
police themselves. The presumption of innocence of the traditional
criminal law is thus incompatible with the effective enforcement of white
collar criminal law. Hence, the internal logic of white collar criminal law
itself leads to the incentives that are built into the Guidelines. The
Guidelines contain the incentives they do because one of their essential
193. Barcella, Jr., et al., supra note 186, at S2.
194. ISRAEL & LAFAVE, supra note 33, at 26.
195. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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functions is to conscript businesses into the war on white collar crime.196
A second important effect of the Organizational Guidelines is that they
enable prosecutors to circumvent the organization’s attorney-client
privilege.
As discussed previously, organizations have no Fifth
Therefore, the
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.197
organization’s attorney-client privilege is the only impediment to a
prosecutor obtaining all potentially incriminating evidence in the
possession of a corporate defendant. By empowering prosecutors to deny
organizations the five point reduction in their culpability score for
cooperation unless they waive attorney-client privilege,198 the Guidelines
effectively emasculate the privilege by making it too costly to assert. This
gives prosecutors open access to all corporate records for the purpose of
building a case against both the organization and its employees.
The advantage of this access for prosecutors is not so much that it
provides them with otherwise unobtainable information, but that it greatly
reduces the cost of developing obtainable information on their own. The
attorney-client privilege protects only communications made to and by the
organization’s counsel in anticipation of litigation.199 Hence, it does not
allow an organization to prevent the prosecution from obtaining any factual
evidence of criminal activity. As the Supreme Court has pointed out,
“[a]pplication of the attorney-client privilege to communications . . . puts
the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never
taken place. The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it
does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who
communicated with the attorney.”200 Thus, “[t]he client cannot be
compelled to answer the question, ‘What did you say or write to the
attorney?’ but may not refuse to disclose any relevant fact within his
knowledge merely because he incorporated a statement of such fact into his

196. See Winthrop Swenson, The Organizational Guidelines’ “Carrot and Stick”
Philosophy, and Their Focus on “Effective” Compliance, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: LAW
AND PRACTICE 782, 785 (Jerold H. Israel et al. eds., 1st ed. 1996) (articulating that the
Guidelines’ third objective is “to create incentives for companies to take crime controlling
actions.”).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
198. This policy, which was implicit prior to November 1, 2004, is now explicitly
recognized by the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12 (providing that
“[w]aiver of attorney-client privilege and of work product protections is not a prerequisite to
a reduction in culpability score . . . unless such waiver is necessary in order to provide
timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information known to the organization.”)
(emphasis added); see also Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 178, at 155-56 (contending that
the ambiguous word “necessary” used in the Thompson Memorandum, and now enshrined
in the Sentencing Guidelines, enables federal prosecutors to obtain a corporation’s waiver of
attorney-client privilege).
199. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
200. Id.
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communication to his attorney.”201 Accordingly, prosecutors are free to
question any and all corporate employees in an attempt to develop evidence
of criminal activity themselves. This, however, can be an expensive
undertaking, both in man-hours and because employees tend to be less
forthcoming with police agents than they are with corporate counsel.
Further, unlike organizations, individuals do possess a Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, which they may assert in order to refrain
from supplying information to the government. Thus, getting access to the
internal investigations performed by corporate counsel allows prosecutors
both to avoid the expense of performing the investigation themselves and to
obtain information that would otherwise be barred by individuals’ Fifth
Amendment rights. Hence, by inducing organizations to waive their
attorney-client privileges, the Guidelines allow prosecutors to kill two
liberal birds with one stone; circumventing not only the corporate common
law privilege, but the individual constitutional one as well.
Finally, the Organizational Guidelines help prosecutors avoid having to
overcome the presumption of innocence in its cases against individuals as
well. By requiring organizations not only to refrain from helping their
employees prepare a defense, but to affirmatively aid the government in
making its case against them in order to get the culpability score reduction
for cooperation, the Guidelines greatly increase both the cost and the risk
individual employees face in electing to go to trial. Given that white collar
criminal defense costs can frequently run in the hundreds of thousands of
dollars,202 the refusal to advance employees’ legal fees can bring intense
pressure on individual employees to plead guilty. This financial pressure is
exacerbated by the fact that by defending themselves, the employees are
refusing to cooperate with the government, and thus, under the Thompson
Memorandum, the organization must fire them in order to be assured that
it will be regarded as cooperating.203 Adding to this pressure is the
increased risk of conviction that arises from the organization not only
turning over all incriminating evidence to the government, but also
informing the government of any request for documents or information that
the employees may make in preparing their defense. Under these
circumstances, a significant number of individual targets of federal
investigations will elect to forgo their day in court and plead guilty, which,
of course, entirely relieves prosecutors of the burden of establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.204
201. Id. at 396 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831
(E.D. Pa. 1962)).
202. See Laurie P. Cohen, Prosecutor’s Tough New Tactics Turn Firms Against
Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1.
203. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI.B.
204. Since this Article was written, the United States Supreme Court decided United
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II. FIVE ETHICAL DILEMMAS
The traditional criminal law may be an adequate mechanism for
combating violent crime or actions that directly harm or violate the rights
of others. Its inherent liberal features, however, make it a poor tool for
extending the kind of social control necessary to suppress general dishonest
or deceptive behavior and the violation of malum prohibitum regulations.
By nevertheless criminalizing such conduct, the federal government created
a body of law that it could not effectively enforce within the confines of the
traditional criminal law. Hence, the internal logic of the federal campaign
against white collar crime required significant alterations to both the
substance and procedures of the criminal law that would eliminate, or
permit the circumvention of, several of its liberal safeguards. These
alterations arrived via the recognition of the concept of corporate criminal
responsibility, the creation of broad new substantive, regulatory, and
secondary offenses, and the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines. The principal effect of the first and third of these innovations
was to effectively deputize America’s business organizations as auxiliary
law enforcement agents, while the principal effect of the second was to
vastly expand the range of activities within the ambit of the criminal
sanction.
These alterations to the workings of the criminal law significantly
changed the environment within which corporate officers make managerial
decisions. Most significantly, they changed the legal rewards and
punishments associated with the way organizations treat their employees.
If ethics were coextensive with obedience to law, this would not constitute
a problem. Acting in accordance with the law and its incentives would be
equivalent to acting ethically, and organizations need have no qualms about
treating their employees in whatever way the law demanded. But, ethics is
not coextensive with legality, and responding to legal incentives does not

States v. Booker, and United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), holding the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional and rendering them merely advisory. In the author’s
opinion, these decisions undermine none of the points raised in this Article. The Guidelines
still serve as the basic framework for determining an organization’s fine. Although judges
are now free to depart from the Guideline sentencing range when circumstances warrant,
this will not affect the ordinary case. Judges will still calculate and be guided by an
organization’s culpability score, which means the incentives created by the enhancement for
obstruction of justice and the reductions for having an effective compliance program and for
cooperation will still be in effect. Further, the decisions have no effect at all on the
Thompson Memorandum, which means the Guidelines’ incentives for cooperation will still
be operative as a means of avoiding indictment, something that is more important to
organizations than merely reducing their fines upon conviction. Finally, organizations will
be aware that should they be indicted, their ability to receive the five point culpability score
reduction for cooperation still depends on their receiving a recommendation to that effect
from the prosecutor, whose standards for cooperation are likewise governed by the
Thompson Memorandum.
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guarantee that an organization is acting ethically, as the Jim Crow
legislation that mandated racial segregation makes abundantly clear.
Therefore, to the extent that white collar criminal law induces organizations
to treat their employees improperly or violate any other ethical obligation,
it can create difficult and poignant ethical dilemmas for the organizations’
managers.
There is currently a wide range of opinions regarding the nature and
extent of business persons’ ethical obligations. On one end of the
ideological spectrum is the so-called stockholder theory,205 which views
corporate officers as agents of the organization’s owners (the stockholders)
who have a fiduciary obligation to pursue their principals’ interests, usually
characterized as the maximization of profits, in preference to those of all
other parties. At the other end of the spectrum, are the stakeholder and
social contract theories, which view corporate officers as having ethical
obligations to not merely the organization’s owners, but, in the case of the
stakeholder theory, to all parties whose interests are significantly affected
by the organization’s activities, such as employees, customers, suppliers,
and the local community;206 or, in the case of the social contract theory, to
society as a whole.207 But all of these theories share two common
features—they recognize that business people retain all the ordinary ethical
obligations that they possess as human beings208 and they instruct business
people to fulfill their ethical obligations within the law. Thus, to the extent
the law requires business people to act in ways that would violate either
their personal ethical obligations or those additional obligations that arise
from their status as corporate officers, a business person’s legal and ethical
obligations are in conflict. The question then becomes which obligation
should predominate. Currently, this question arises in at least five areas of
managerial decision-making—those concerning the organization’s efforts
to: (1) realize organizational justice; (2) properly respect employees’
205. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also John
Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 8 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 19, 21-25 (1998).
206. William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern
Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 75 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed., 1993); see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at
25-28.
207. See Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of
Business Ethics: Integrative Social Contracts Theory, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 252 (1994);
see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 29-30.
208. In other words, becoming a business person may subject individuals to the
additional ethical obligations specified by the various theories of business ethics, but it does
not relieve them of any of the obligations they possess as human beings. Becoming the
agent of an organization’s owners or stakeholders, or of society at large, does not empower
one to take actions that would be unethical if they were undertaken on one’s own behalf.
Dennis P. Quinn & Thomas M. Jones, An Agent Morality View of Business Policy, 20
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 22, 37-38 (1995).

10/3/2005 1:33 PM

HASNAS

2005]

ETHICS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIME

629

privacy; (3) maintain needed confidentiality; (4) engender trust within the
organization; and (5) engage in ethical self-assessment.
A. Organizational Justice
Questions of justice are not limited to the realm of the law. Although
justice may be the cardinal virtue of a legal system, legal justice is not all
of justice. Justice is the general virtue that requires the fair treatment of
individuals in all interpersonal relationships.209
Because business
organizations consist of networks of interpersonal relationships, questions
of justice necessarily arise in the context of organizations as well.
Organizations have an ethical obligation to treat their employees justly.
But precisely what does this obligation entail?
This question may be asked from both a deontological and
consequentialist perspective. From a deontological perspective, the
question would be whether justice demands that organizations treat their
employees in certain ways as a matter of principle, regardless of the
consequences. In the context of this article, this amounts to the question of
what principles govern the treatment of employees who are suspected of
criminal wrongdoing by federal authorities. At least three principles are
implicated—reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process.
Reciprocity refers to the obligation to honor one’s commitment to a
mutually beneficial relationship when the other party has met his or her
commitment to you. Business organizations expect their employees to
exhibit loyalty to the organization and to advance the organization’s
interests in preference to those of competitors or outside groups.210 The
principle of reciprocity requires that, to the extent that employees act in
accordance with this duty of loyalty, the organization exhibit a similar
loyalty to its employees’ by giving their interests preference over those of
outside parties.211 The presumption of innocence refers to the more general
version of the ethical principle that operates within the criminal law.
Because of employees’ limited resources and dependence on the employer,
and because it is so difficult to prove a negative, justice requires that
organizations not assume that their employees have behaved improperly in
the absence of adequate evidence. The presumption of innocence may also
209. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 5 (D. A. Rees ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1951).
210. See NORMAN BOWIE, BUSINESS ETHICS 141 (1982); Sissela Bok, Whistleblowing
and Professional Responsibilities, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 306 (Tom L.
Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993).
211. See Patricia H. Werhane, Employee and Employer Rights in an Institutional
Context, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 270-71 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E.
Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988) (explaining that in exchange for working for, being fair to, and
respecting their employers, employees should expect fair pay, privacy, and due process in
the workplace).

10/3/2005 1:33 PM

HASNAS

630

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:579

be seen as derivative of the principle of reciprocity in the sense that it
constitutes a specific instance of the loyalty that an organization owes to its
employees in return for its employees’ loyalty to the organization. Finally,
due process refers to the requirement that one be judged by fair processes,
which include an opportunity to speak in one’s own defense. Like the
presumption of innocence, due process may be seen as either a general
requirement of justice or as an obligation derived from the principle of
reciprocity.
If justice truly demands that organizations act in accordance with the
principles of reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process,
then a business manager’s legal and ethical obligations will come into
conflict. We have seen that the concept of corporate criminal responsibility
and the requirements of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines place the
organization and its employees in an adversarial relationship. Because the
organization is strictly liable for the actions that its employees perform
within the scope of their employment, the only way for the organization to
reduce its exposure to financial penalties is to cooperate with the
government in its investigation of the organization’s employees. But as
previously noted, under the Guidelines, cooperation requires the
organization to essentially become part of the prosecutorial team.212 And
this, in turn, requires the organization to violate all three of the principles of
organizational justice.
With regard to the question of whether an organization’s employees
engaged in criminal wrongdoing, there are only three epistemological
possibilities—the organization may know that the employee is guilty, it
may know that the employee is innocent, or it may not know whether the
employee is guilty or innocent. If the organization knows that the
employee is guilty, there may be no problem. In such a case, cooperating
with the prosecution would breach neither the principle of reciprocity nor
the presumption of innocence because, by breaking the law, the employee
breached his or her duty of loyalty to the organization and hence is entitled
to none in return, and because the organization has, by hypothesis,
adequate evidence of guilt. On the other hand, even in this case, there may
be a due process problem because even the guilty are entitled to a fair
hearing before being subject to sanction, and the Guidelines’ timeliness
requirement for cooperation can require an organization to take action
against an employee without delay.213
If the organization knows the employee is innocent, however, the
212. See supra text accompanying notes 171-194.
213. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g)(1) (noting that, for a corporation to meet its
timeliness requirement, it must report or take action against an employee before a
government investigation begins); supra text accompanying notes 172-173 (same).
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Guidelines place it in an impossible situation. To gain the five point
reduction in its culpability score for cooperation, the organization must
help the government try to convict an innocent person. The organization
must breach reciprocity by eschewing aid to a loyal employee, act in
contravention of the presumption of innocence by taking action against the
employee despite the lack of evidence of wrongdoing, and violate due
process by either denying the employee a fair hearing or acting in
derogation of what such a hearing would establish.
Yet, if the
organization’s managers do not act in this way, they expose the
organization to criminal indictment and potentially massive financial
penalties.
The same holds true in those cases in which the organization does not
know whether the employee is guilty or innocent; a situation in which
organizations will frequently find themselves due to the indistinct border
between lawful and criminal conduct associated with broadly defined
crimes such as the federal fraud offenses.214 This is precisely the situation
in which the principles of organizational justice are most pertinent because
they instruct organizations to give employees the benefit of the doubt. In
this situation, reciprocity, the presumption of innocence, and due process
may require organizations to provide their employees with legal advice,
help them to defray the cost of defending themselves, and retain them in
their positions until their guilt or innocence is established. Yet, this is
precisely the type of behavior that the Guidelines discourage.
A similar result obtains if one views questions of justice from a
consequentialist perspective. Over the past several decades, a great deal of
academic and managerial attention has been devoted to the internal
dynamics of organizations.215 Those engaged in such “organizational
behavior” research study how individuals respond to incentives in
organizations in an effort to build better interpersonal relationships that
allow organizations to achieve their objectives more effectively. One
aspect of this study concerns how the fairness with which employees are
treated and perceive themselves as being treated affects both the
employees’ and organization’s performance. This research demonstrates
that organizations that are committed to providing procedural justice216 to
214. See supra text accompanying notes 83-94.
215. See, e.g., Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytical
Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 426
(2000).
216. Organizational justice researchers define procedural justice in terms of six criteria:
[T]o be perceived as fair, [p]rocedures should (a) be applied consistently across
people and across time, (b) be free from bias (e.g., ensuring that a third party has no
vested interest in a particular settlement), (c) ensure that accurate information is
collected and used in making decisions, (d) have some mechanism to correct
flawed or inaccurate decisions, (e) conform to personal or prevailing standards of
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their employees have employees who are more satisfied with their jobs and
exhibit higher levels of commitment to the organization’s goals.217 That is,
organizations whose employees view themselves as being treated fairly
tend to perform better than those whose employees do not.218 Thus,
regardless of whether one adheres to the stakeholder or social contract
theories that posit an independent obligation to employees,219 or the
stockholder theory that instructs managers to create the most efficient
organization,220 managers have, all other things being equal, an ethical
obligation to ensure the just treatment of an organization’s employees.
However, since the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines took effect, all
other things are not equal. Now, maintaining corporate policies of
procedural justice with regard to employees under federal investigation can
subject the organization to indictment or a greatly increased fine. Under
these circumstances, it is no longer clear that preserving organizational
justice is in the organization’s best interest.
Thus, managers are faced with conflicting legal and ethical obligations
that require them to make extremely difficult decisions. If the law demands
cooperation, does that make it ethical to help the government prosecute
those who are or might be innocent or to deny organizational due process to
these employees? On the other hand, is it ethical to put the stockholder’s
money and the well-being of the organization’s other stakeholders at risk
merely to give a fair hearing to those who may well have broken the law
and put the organization in jeopardy? Think back to the first of the
vignettes with which I began this article. If you were the CEO of MTS and
sincerely believed Tudor to be innocent of the offenses with which she is
charged, would you act on this belief? Should you? Does MTS owe any
loyalty to Tudor? If so, how much? Enough to put the company at risk by
standing by her until her guilt is established? The combination of corporate
criminal responsibility, which holds organizations strictly liable for the
offenses of its employees, and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines,
which effectively punishes organizations for putting on a (losing) defense,
ethics or morality, and (f) ensure that the opinions of various groups affected by the
decision have been taken into account.
Id. at 426.
217. Id. at 434.
218. See Marshall Sashkin & Richard L. Williams, Does Fairness Make a Difference?,
19 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 56, 57 (1990).
219. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 97 (noting that under the stakeholder
theory, managers owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders, including suppliers, customers,
employees, and community members); see also THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND
MORALITY 57 (1982) (revealing that social contract theorists believe that organizations’
underlying functions are to promote social welfare to consumers and employees).
220. See Hasnas, supra note 205, at 22 (stating that the stockholder theory poses the
view that managers have the sole duty of increasing profits by an legal, non-fraudulent
means possible).
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drives a financial wedge between the interests of the organization and its
employees. Thus, the contemporary law of white collar crime literally
confronts corporate managers with an age-old ethical dilemma: what price
loyalty?
B. Privacy
Like justice, privacy has both a legal and an ethical dimension. The
constitutional right to privacy protects individuals against state and federal
government interference with certain intimate decisions and conduct, and
the common law right to privacy protects them against certain invasions of
their private space and unwanted revelations of private facts by their fellow
citizens. But these legal protections do not necessarily exhaust the amount
of privacy that individuals are morally entitled to enjoy. The moral right to
privacy refers to a wider realm of protection against intrusion into one’s
personal affairs, the public dissemination of one’s secrets, and the type of
constant supervision and monitoring associated with Orwell’s 1984.221
Thus, ethically speaking, “[t]he concept of privacy limits the amount and
effectiveness of social control over an individual. . . . Privacy protects the
individual by limiting scrutiny by others and the control some of them have
over our lives.”222
Employees of private business organizations have little legal protection
against their employer’s invasion of their privacy in the workplace.223
Because constitutional provisions do not apply to private actions,
employers legally can, and sometimes do, subject their employees to
intense monitoring.224 Ethical requirements to respect individuals’ privacy
221. See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
222. Rogene Buchholz, Privacy, in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
BUSINESS ETHICS 504 (Patricia H. Werhane & R. Edward Freeman eds., 1997).
223. Laura B. Pincus & Clayton Trotter, The Disparity between Public and Private
Sector Employee Privacy Protections: A Call for Legitimate Privacy Rights for Private
Sector Workers, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 51, 54 (2001).
224. For example,
Drug and alcohol testing through hair follicles reveals data relating to the subject’s
personal life for a period of up to six months for a three-inch section of hair.
Employee monitoring or surveillance systems infiltrate the worker’s daily
environment, yielding information as banal as how many times the individual takes
bathroom breaks during the work day. In one instance, telephone calls received by
airline reservation agents were electronically monitored on a second-by-second
basis; agents were allowed only eleven seconds between each call and twelve
minutes of break time each day. In fact, it is estimated that American employers
monitor more than 750 calls every minute.
Surveillance permeates other areas of the work place, as well. Employers monitor
the key-strokes of two-thirds of all computer operators, and complaints of employer
e-mail intrusions are increasing. A recent MacWorld survey found that twenty-two
percent of large businesses in a variety of industries “engaged in searches of
employee computer files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other networking
communications,” and fewer than one-third of these companies warn the workers
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do apply to the workplace, however, and limit the extent to which business
organizations may legitimately spy on their employees. From the
stakeholder and social contract perspectives, employees’ rights to privacy
in the workplace flow either from the organization’s obligation to respect
the dignity of their stakeholder groups, which include employees,225 or
from an implicit term in the social contract between society and business
organizations.226
Further, even from the stockholder perspective,
organizations have an ethical obligation to respect employees’ privacy
because, like the maintenance of organizational justice, doing so produces a
workforce that performs better and is more committed to the organization’s
success.227
By entering into the employment relationship, employees waive their
right to privacy to a certain degree. Employers are entitled to job-related
information about their employees—information that is necessary to ensure
that employees can adequately perform their jobs in an appropriate
manner.228 Further, employers are entitled to monitor their employees’
behavior to the extent necessary to ensure that they do so perform.229 But
employers are not ethically entitled to pry into employees’ personal lives or
to monitor employees’ behavior for other purposes, even though acquiring
such information or engaging in such action may improve overall corporate
performance. The law of white collar crime, however, virtually requires
business organizations to exceed these ethical constraints.
Because the standard for corporate criminal responsibility makes
organizations strictly liable for the offenses of their employees,
organizations can avoid criminal liability only by preventing their
employees from violating the law. This pressure is reinforced by the
that such surveillance is taking place.
Id. at 52-53.
225. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 101.
226. See Laura P. Hartman, Technology and Ethics: Privacy in the Workplace, 106
BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 1, 17 (2001). In contemporary social contract terminology, the right to
privacy constitutes a “hypernorm”—a principle “so fundamental to human existence that [it]
serve[s] as a guide in evaluating lower level moral norms,” Donaldson & Dunfee, supra
note 207, at 265—that all business organizations are required to respect.
227. See BOWIE, supra note 210, at 90-91; see also Pincus & Trotter, supra note 223, at
56.
228. Pincus & Trotter, supra note 223, at 88.
229. See George Brenkert, Privacy, Polygraphs, and Work, in BUSINESS ETHICS:
READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY 294, 295 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer
Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990) (noting that “the information to which the employer . . . is
entitled . . . is that information which regards his possible acceptable performance of the
services for which he might be hired.”); see also Joseph R. Des Jardins & Ronald Duska,
Drug Testing in Employment, in BUSINESS ETHICS: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE
MORALITY 301, 302 (W. Michael Hoffman & Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990)
(explaining that “an employee’s right to privacy is violated whenever personal information
is . . . collected, and/or used by an employer in a way or for any purpose that is irrelevant
to . . . [their] contractual relationship.”).
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Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which provide a three point
reduction in an organization’s culpability score for maintaining an effective
program designed to prevent and detect criminal conduct by its
employees.230 But an organization can prevent its employees from
violating the law only by gathering sufficient information about them to
allow the organization to determine who is likely to violate the law, and by
intensely monitoring the actions its employees take within the scope of
their employment. Indeed, this is precisely what the Guidelines require,
because an effective compliance program requires organizations to “use
reasonable efforts not to include within the substantial authority personnel
of the organization any individual whom the organization knew, or should
have known through the exercise of due diligence, has engaged in illegal
activities or other conduct inconsistent with an effective compliance and
ethics program,”231 and “take reasonable steps to ensure that the
organization’s compliance and ethics program is followed, including
monitoring and auditing to detect criminal conduct.”232 Therefore, the law
creates incentives for organizations to violate their employees’ privacy in
ways that conflict with the organizations’ ethical obligations not to do so.
Once again, corporate managers are confronted with difficult ethical
choices. Do legal obligations to act as deputy law enforcement agents
trump their ethical obligations to respect their employees’ dignity? If not,
how much risk of criminal liability or increased criminal penalties are
managers required to run? To what extent is it ethical to jeopardize the
stockholders’ and other stakeholders’ material interests in order to preserve
the intangible interests of the organization’s employees? Putting yourself
again in the place of the hypothetical CEO of MTS, recall that cooperation
with the government requires the organization to review and turn over to
the prosecution the records of all of Tudor’s appointments, phone calls, email correspondence, and personal revelations made in confidence to the
organization’s corporate counsel. How sure are you that this is the
ethically correct thing to do?
C. Confidentiality
There is good reason to believe that organizations are ethically obligated
to maintain the confidentiality of certain internal communications. Like
organizational justice and privacy, this obligation derives from both
principled and practical considerations. The principle involved is the basic
ethical obligation to keep one’s word. If one party reveals information to a

230. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(b).
231. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(3) (emphasis added).
232. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added).
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second only because the latter promises to keep the information
confidential, the promise ethically binds the second party to do so. This is
equally true when the second party is an organization that is promising
confidentiality to an employee or other stakeholder. To obtain information
under a promise of confidentiality and then disclose it under circumstances
not agreed to by the confiding party is essentially to obtain the information
by means of a false promise on which the confiding party relied in
revealing the information. Such action is ethically indistinguishable from
fraud.
On the practical level, confidentiality is necessary to facilitate the flow
of information through the organization. Employees (and outsiders) will
often be unwilling to reveal information when they believe they will suffer
adverse consequences if it becomes known they have done so. This is
especially true with regard to information indicating that they, their
colleagues, or their superiors are involved in unethical or illegal behavior.
Thus, only by promising confidentiality can organizations guarantee that
their management will receive the information necessary for them to run
not only efficiently, but ethically and legally as well.
Like the obligations to maintain organizational justice and respect
employee privacy, the obligation to preserve promised confidentiality is
recognized by all normative approaches to business ethics. From the
stakeholder perspective, the obligation to preserve confidentiality is an
aspect of the duty to avoid deceptive and fraudulent dealing that is implicit
in the requirement to treat all stakeholders in accordance with the Kantian
principle of respect for persons.233 From the social contract perspective, the
obligation is an explicit requirement of the justice term of the contract, or
in more contemporary terminology, a hypernorm, that is binding on all
business organizations.234 Finally, from the stockholder perspective, the
obligation is both explicitly recognized by the theory’s fundamental
directive to maximize profits, or otherwise carry out the stockholder’s
instructions without engaging in fraud or deception,235 and implicit in the
fact that preserving confidentiality increases business organizations’
efficiency.
Organizations usually promise confidentiality in two ways. First, as a
means of gathering sensitive information that otherwise would not be
forthcoming, organizations often create lines of communication that
circumvent the ordinary corporate chain of command, such as employee
233. See Evan & Freeman, supra note 206, at 97; see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 27.
234. See DONALDSON, supra note 219, at 53; see also Hasnas, supra note 205, at 30-31.
235. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 205, at 133 (stating that “there is one and only one social
responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase
its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open
and free competition without deception or fraud.”).
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hotlines or organizational ombudsmen.236 To encourage employees to
utilize such alternative lines of communication, organizations typically
promise to keep any information transmitted through them confidential. In
this way, upper management hopes to receive information from lower level
employees concerning the job performance and ethical behavior of the
employees’ colleagues and superiors that could not be otherwise obtained.
Second, in order to accumulate the information necessary both to defend
the organization against civil lawsuits and criminal charges, and to ensure
that the organization is complying with the law, organizations encourage
their employees to provide information to corporate counsel under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege. That is, organizations promise
their employees that if they talk to the organizations’ attorneys, what they
say will not be revealed to outsiders unless it meets one of the recognized
exceptions to the privilege.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the importance of
an organization’s ability to promise the second type of confidentiality.237
Noting that, given the legal standard for corporate criminal responsibility,
[m]iddle-level—and indeed lower-level—employees can, by actions
within the scope of their employment, embroil the corporation in serious
legal difficulties, and it is only natural that these employees would have
the relevant information needed by corporate counsel if he is adequately
to advise the client with respect to such actual or potential difficulties,238

the Court recognized that the attorney-client privilege is necessary to
encourage “the communication of relevant information by employees of the
client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client
corporation.”239 The Court further recognized that, given the advent of the
myriad new substantive, regulatory, and secondary criminal offenses, the
privilege was necessary to promote
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client’s
compliance with the law. In light of the vast and complicated array of
regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corporations,
unlike most individuals, “constantly go to lawyers to find out how to
obey the law,” particularly since compliance with the law in this area is
hardly an instinctive matter.240

Business organizations’ obligation to maintain promised confidentiality
236. See James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an Organizational
Phenomenon, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN BUSINESS 160 (A. Pablo
Iannone ed., 1989); see also DONALDSON, supra note 219, at 154-55 (describing how many
U.S. companies utilize “hot-lines” and “operator” policies to encourage employees to speak
truthfully).
237. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 383 (1981).
238. Id. at 391.
239. Id. at 392.
240. Id. (citation omitted).
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is not absolute, of course, but is limited to the amount of confidentiality
organizations have it within their power to grant. Employers have never
been able to promise employees (or others) complete confidentiality,
merely the degree of confidentiality the law allows. Thus, organizations
cannot promise to keep revelations confidential in the face of a valid
subpoena that does not improperly invade the attorney-client privilege.
The most that organizations can, and hence do, promise their employees is
that they will act in good faith to maintain confidentiality to the extent that
they are legally permitted to do so.
The incentives created by the law of white collar crime, however, are at
odds with honoring even this limited obligation. As previously noted,
organizations’ strict liability for the offenses of their employees and the
requirements of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines imply that
organizations can avoid indictment or reduce their exposure to financial
penalties only by cooperating with government investigations of their
employees.241 But under the Guidelines, cooperation requires “the
disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization,”242
which in turn, may require the waiver of the attorney-client privilege.243
Thus, to gain the benefits of cooperation, organizations must disclose to the
government not merely all of the information they are legally required to
disclose, but all relevant information in their possession. Refusing to do so
on the ground that such disclosure would violate a promise of
confidentiality could subject an organization to a potentially massive
increase in liability.
This places corporate managers in an extremely difficult ethical
situation. To generate the information necessary to maintain an ethical
workplace and ensure that the organization’s employees are complying
with the law, management must promise its employees confidentiality. But
to avoid subjecting the organization to indictment and large monetary fines,
management must not only breach that promise, but must do so before a
government investigation has even begun—according to the Guidelines,
“prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation.”244
Furthermore, management cannot avoid the dilemma by making only a
conditional promise to keep information confidential unless disclosure is
necessary for the organization to cooperate with the government. Such a
promise would be patently self-defeating since it is tantamount to saying
that the organization will keep the information confidential unless it is in
the organization’s interest to disclose it, which is the same as saying it will
241.
242.
243.
244.

See supra notes 171-194, 212 and accompanying text.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12.
See supra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g)(1).
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not keep the information confidential at all. This type of promise is
obviously valueless—something the Supreme Court recognized in the
context of the attorney-client privilege, stating “if the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client must be able
to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will
be protected. An uncertain privilege . . . is little better than no privilege at
all.”245 Hence, such a conditional promise will elicit no useful information
from the organization’s employees and is equivalent to making no promise
of confidentiality at all.
But even an organization that decided not to promise any confidentiality
for employees’ (or others’) communications could not escape the dilemma.
By refusing on ethical grounds to make a promise that it knows it will have
to break, such an organization could decide to conduct its business without
the information that such a promise would generate. But in doing so, it
would be willingly foregoing one of the most effective means of detecting
violations of law by its employees—a decision which would, under the
Guidelines, cost the organization the three point reduction in culpability
score for failing to have an effective compliance program. As previously
noted, one of the requirements for such a program is that the organization
“have and publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow
for anonymity or confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees
and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual
criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.”246 But since whistleblowers
are usually subject to retaliation if their identity is known, such a reporting
system not merely “may,” but virtually must be one that promises
confidentiality.247 Indeed, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress
required publicly traded companies to establish procedures for “the
confidential, anonymous submission by employees of issues or concerns
regarding questionable accounting or auditing practices.”248 Thus, even the
245. Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 393.
246. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C).
247. See Practising Law Institute, Report of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 1417 PLI/CORP 159, 243-47 (2004). In its report,
the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines recommended
amending the Guidelines to make the requirement of anonymity, if not confidentiality,
explicit by requiring organizations “to have a system whereby the organization’s employees
and agents may report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual violations of law
without fear of retaliation, including mechanisms to allow for anonymous reporting.” Id. at
249 (emphasis added). The Sentencing Commissions proposed that the amendments to the
Guidelines weaken this requirement somewhat, requiring organizations “to have and
publicize a system, which may include mechanisms that allow for anonymity or
confidentiality, whereby the organization’s employees and agents may report or seek
guidance regarding potential or actual criminal conduct without fear of retaliation.” Notice
of Submission to Congress of Amendments to The Sentencing Guidelines Effective
November 1, 2004, 69 Fed. Reg. 28994, 29019 (proposed May 19, 2004).
248. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 776
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decision not to make a promise of confidentiality would significantly
increase an organization’s potential liability. In sum, the law of white
collar crime brings intense pressure to bear on organizations to both make
and breach promises of confidentiality.
The conflict thus created presents corporate managers with several
difficult ethical decisions. What should they tell employees about the
organization’s commitment to preserve the confidentiality of
communications made through the employee hotline or under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege? If the organization promises to
keep such communications confidential, is it ethical to breach that promise
to protect the organization as a collective entity? On the other hand, to
what extent is it ethical to expose the stockholders and other stakeholders
to the risk of loss associated with corporate indictment and increased
criminal penalties in order to honor the organization’s commitment to
individual employees, many of whom may have engaged in criminal
wrongdoing? Can corporate managers afford to honestly tell employees
that the organization will disclose any incriminating communications made
to the “confidential” employee hotline or to corporate counsel under the
protection of the attorney-client privilege whenever doing so is necessary
to gain the benefits of cooperation under the Guidelines? If they do, will
the organization be able to gather the information necessary to ensure that
it is functioning ethically and in compliance with the law? Would any
employee involved in an offense be willing to come forward? If not, how
deceptive may the managers ethically be on this point?
Recall the second vignette from the beginning of this article. Stone Fund
became aware of Gordon Gekko’s illegal behavior when Budd Fox
approached the organization’s attorney for assurance that what he was
doing for Gekko was legal. Further, Fox spoke after being assured that his
communications were protected by attorney-client privilege. Upon
learning that Gekko and Fox were engaged in criminal activity, what
should Stone Fund’s management do? If it decides to fire Gekko but not
report his and Fox’s activities to the government, it exposes the
organization to the risk of greatly enhanced penalties should the matter
subsequently come to light. Not only would Stone Fund lose the potential
reductions to its culpability score for failing to have an effective
compliance program and for failing to cooperate with the government, its
score would be increased three points for its obstruction of justice. On the
other hand, the organization’s managers cannot report Gekko’s and Fox’s
activities to the government and disclose “all pertinent information known

(emphasis added).
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by the organization”249 without waiving its attorney-client privilege and
violating its promise of confidentiality to Fox. Assume again that you are
one of the senior executives at Stone Fund. How sure are you that you
know what constitutes ethical behavior under these circumstances?
D. Trust
Unlike organizational justice, privacy, and confidentiality, trust does not
embody an ethical principle. Although ethicists have argued that corporate
managers who actively encourage their subordinates to trust them are
thereby invested with positive moral obligations for the subordinates’ wellbeing,250 there is no independent moral obligation to trust others. Trust is
nevertheless inextricably linked to ethical concerns because its existence in
the workplace is dependent on the ethical behavior of corporate
management. That is, unless corporate management meets its ethical
obligations to its stakeholders and is perceived by them as doing so, no
relationship of trust will develop or be maintained between the organization
and its stakeholders.251 And because the maintenance of such a relationship
of trust is essential to the success of the organization,252 trust serves as a
necessary link between corporate performance and ethical behavior.
Trust among stakeholders has become basic to the management of
business firms in a competitive global economy. Trust leads to
commitment, which results in effort, which is essential for success. But,
trust can be generated only by treating members of the stakeholder
groups in ways that they consider to be “right” and “just” and “fair.”
Treating groups in ways that can be considered to be “right” and “just”
and “fair” is, of course, the domain of managerial ethics . . . .253

An organization’s employees are one of its most important stakeholder
groups. However, the personal interests of individual employees often
diverge from the corporate interest of the organization. Consequently,
businesses must expend resources to overcome the resulting commitment

249. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 12.
250. Edward Soule, Trust and Managerial Responsibility, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 249, 268
(1998).
251. See LaRue Tone Hosmer, Why Be Moral? A Different Rationale for Managers, 4
BUS. ETHICS Q. 191, 202 (1994)(stating that “managers can build trust over time only by
treating the members of the stakeholder groups in ways that they consider to be ‘right’ and
‘just’ and ‘fair.’”).
252. Id. at 192 (“We can . . . legitimately make the claim that acting in ways that can be
considered to be ‘right’ and ‘just’ and ‘fair’ is absolutely essential to the long-term
competitive success of the firm.”); see also FRANK K. SONNENBERG, MANAGING WITH A
CONSCIENCE:
HOW TO IMPROVE PERFORMANCE THROUGH INTEGRITY, TRUST, AND
COMMITMENT 188 (1996) (arguing that without trust, no company can ever hope for
excellence). See also Bryan W. Husted, The Ethical Limits of Trust in Business Relations, 8
BUS. ETHICS Q. 233, 233 (1998).
253. Hosmer, supra note 251, at 193.
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problems, that is, to align the incentives of its individual employees with
the achievement of the organization’s goals. But,
[b]ecause these commitment problems (opportunism) abound, firms that
solve commitment problems efficiently will have a competitive
advantage over those that do not. Further, because ethical solutions to
commitment problems are more efficient than mechanisms designed to
curb opportunism, it follows that firms that contract (through their
managers) with their [employees] on the basis of mutual trust and
cooperation will have a competitive advantage over firms that do not.254

An organization that maintains a relationship of trust with its employees
“will experience reduced agency costs, transaction costs, and costs
associated with team production. More specifically, monitoring costs,
bonding costs, search costs, warranty costs, and residual losses will be
reduced. . . . In such cases, overall contracting costs are reduced, and the
benefits are shared among the firm and its stakeholders.”255 Hence,
maintaining the trust of its employees can be crucial to an organization’s
competitive success.
Trust of the sort that can confer these advantages on organizations can
develop only when three conditions are met: vulnerability, assumption of
duty, and openness. First, trust requires vulnerability on the part of the
trusting party. That is, “trust requires that firms and individuals expose
their vulnerabilities to one another when there is clear uncertainty and risk
that harm could come to the firm, or individuals in the firm, from those
who are trusted.”256 Second, trust requires the trusted party to voluntarily
and openly assume an obligation to protect the interests of the vulnerable
party. That is, “[t]rust is generally accompanied by an assumption of an
acknowledged or accepted duty to protect the rights and interests of others
[that gives rise to a]n expectation of generous or helpful or, at the very
least, nonharmful behavior on the part of the trusted person, group, or firm .
. .”257 Finally, trust requires openness. Trust depends “upon whether each
[individual or firm] is prepared to open up to the other so as to reveal
254. Thomas M. Jones, Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: A Synthesis of Ethics and
Economics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 404, 422 (1995).
255. Id.; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS 60-72 (1992) (asserting
that employers and employees are linked together in a common venture and arguing that an
organization can reduce costs associated with resolving internal conflicts and dissatisfaction
by developing rules that satisfy all of its members).
256. George G. Brenkert, Trust, Morality and International Business, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q.
293, 305 (1998); see LaRue Tone Hosmer, Trust:
The Connecting Link Between
Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 379, 390 (1995)
Trust generally occurs under conditions of vulnerability to the interests of the
individual and dependence upon the behavior of other people. An essential part of
the definition of trust is the expectation that the loss if trust is broken will be much
greater than the gain when trust is maintained; otherwise, the decision to trust
would be simple economic rationality.
257. Hosmer, supra note 256, at 392.
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private or confidential information.”258 Such openness consists in “leveling
with another, as well as not creating or permitting misleading expectations
to be generated in the other.”259 Consequently, trust in the business
environment has been defined as “the reliance by one person, group, or
firm upon a voluntarily accepted duty on the part of another person, group,
or firm to recognize and protect the rights and interests of all others
engaged in a joint endeavor or economic exchange.”260
The problem is that the incentives created by the law of white collar
crime are antithetical to the development of this form of trust. The
standard for corporate criminal responsibility makes the organization
strictly liable for the criminal offenses of its employees. The advent of
broad new substantive, regulatory, and secondary offenses exponentially
increases the chances that employees will either intentionally, negligently,
or in the case of public welfare offenses, innocently violate the law. The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines punish organizations that fail to aid
in the prosecution of any of its employees who the government suspects of
committing an offense. These are hardly conditions that make it
comfortable for organizations to repose significant amounts of trust in their
employees, or for the employees to feel secure in relying on the
organization’s commitment to protect their rights or interests. More
specifically, these are conditions that undermine the second and third
requirements for the development of trust.
The second requirement for trust is that organizations voluntarily and
openly assume an obligation to protect the interests of their employees. By
punishing organizations that honor this obligation in the context of a
criminal investigation, the law of white collar crime makes it extremely
expensive for organizations to assume the necessary obligation.
Employees obviously have interests in being accorded procedural justice
and having their privacy respected and confidences maintained. But if an
organization wants to avoid indictment and the prospect of greatly
enhanced criminal punishment, it must sacrifice these interests to the
government’s interest in the efficient investigation and punishment of
crime. Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, assuming an
obligation to protect employees’ interests commits organizations to
forgoing the culpability score reductions for effective compliance programs
and cooperation and risking the potential increase for obstruction of justice.
Hence, in the current legal environment, trust comes at a very high price.
On the other hand, should an organization elect not to assume the
obligation to protect its employees’ interests in the context of a criminal
258. Brenkert, supra note 256, at 307.
259. Id.
260. Hosmer, supra note 256, at 393.
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investigation, trust will be considerably less likely to develop. It is very
difficult for an organization to generate “an expectation of generous or
helpful or, at the very least, nonharmful behavior”261 toward its employees
while it is aiding in their prosecution.262
The third requirement for trust is openness. It requires that an
organization “level” with its employees and refrain from “creating or
permitting misleading expectations to be generated”263 about how the
organization will behave with regard to its employees. If an organization
leads or allows its employees to believe that it will afford them due
process, respect their privacy, and maintain promised confidentiality and
then fails to do so at the first hint of a criminal investigation, trust will be
destroyed. For an organization to deal openly with its employees, it must
either frankly inform them that it will fully cooperate with governmental
efforts to prosecute them or, if it claims it will not, make good on this claim
and suffer the consequences of potential indictment and greatly enhanced
penalties. Since the first of these alternatives amounts to a declaration that
the organization will not protect its employees’ interests, it is essentially
equivalent to telling the employees not to trust the organization. Openly
refusing to assume the obligation necessary to generate trust obviously will
not generate trust. But the second alternative, which can generate trust,
highlights how expensive trust becomes in the context of the federal
government’s campaign against white collar crime.
Thus, the law of white collar crime again places conscientious business
managers in a difficult position. Because the trust of their organizations’
employees is an important business asset, the manager’s obligation to the
organizations’ stockholders and/or stakeholders requires them to try to
maintain it. But the maintenance of employees’ trust requires a
commitment to precisely those forms of ethical organizational conduct
(e.g., adhering to the standards of organizational justice, respecting
employee privacy, and maintaining promised confidentiality) that the law
of white collar crime discourages. As a result, managers again find
themselves forced to balance their ethical obligations against their
obligation to fully comply with the law.
Because organizations are strictly liable for the offenses of their
employees, the more trust managers invest in their employees, the more
vulnerable they render their organizations to criminal sanction. In the first
261. Hosmer, supra note 256, at 392.
262. For evidence that this is not merely idle speculation, see Stanley S. Arkin & Charles
Sullivan, Business Crime:
Attacking Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 2004, at 3 (reporting on the effect organizations’ cooperation
with the government can have on their employees’ attitudes), Barcella, Jr. et al., supra note
186, at 52, col. 1, and Cohen, supra note 202.
263. Brenkert, supra note 256, at 307.
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place, the more managers trust their employees and refrain from directly
monitoring their conduct, the easier it becomes for unscrupulous employees
to commit criminal offenses for which the organization is liable.
Additionally, this very trust will result in increased penalties for such
offenses by preventing the organizations from receiving the culpability
score reduction for effective compliance programs. On the other hand, the
more managers take actions designed to guard against criminal liability and
reduce potential penalties, the more they erode the culture of trust within
their organizations. The very act of monitoring their employees’ conduct
in order to detect and prevent the violations of law for which the
organization will be held liable can generate a level of suspicion and
invasion of privacy sufficient to undermine trust.264 And to the extent that
managers comply with the Guidelines’ incentives by sacrificing their
employees’ interests to the government’s, they make it increasingly
unlikely that employees will trust their motives in future dealings.
Thus, managers are once again called upon to confront an array of
difficult ethical choices. How much of their employees’ trust should they
be willing to sacrifice to protect the organization from potential legal
liability? Is it ethical to expose the organization to the risk of indictment
and enhanced criminal penalties in order to protect the interests of their
individual employees sufficiently to generate trust? To the extent that an
organization’s management elects to ignore the Guidelines’ incentives in
order to honor its ethical obligations to its employees, it becomes
imperative for it to prevent its least scrupulous employees from violating
the law. But since ferreting out potential criminals requires secret and
potentially deceptive monitoring practices, how can management do this
without thereby destroying the very trust that it is seeking to maintain?265
And is it ethical to subject the majority of honest employees to this level of
monitoring to protect the organization from the small minority of potential
criminals?
Imagine again that you are a senior executive at Stone Fund when Budd
Fox informs corporate counsel about Gordon Gekko’s and his activities.
Should you fire Fox and report him to the SEC and DOJ as the Guidelines’
standards for cooperation require? If you do, what will be the effect on
your organization when word gets out that this was done after Fox
voluntarily came forward under a promise of confidentiality? To what
extent will the organization’s employees trust management’s
264. See generally James A. Waters, Catch 20.5: Corporate Morality as an
Organizational Phenomenon, in CONTEMPORARY MORAL CONTROVERSIES IN BUSINESS 160
(A. Pablo Iannone ed., 1989) (arguing that a system of “secret informers” will destroy the
spirit of openness that an organization seeks).
265. Id.
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representations to them in the future? But, as the cases of Drexel Burnham
Lambert and Arthur Andersen make clear, mere indictment could destroy a
financial services company like Stone Fund.266 Under such circumstances,
is it ethical not to take every step prescribed by the Thompson Memo to
avoid indictment? What precisely can you do to maintain a climate of trust
within the organization without putting the very existence of the
organization at risk?
E. Ethical Self-Assessment
It is possible that the different normative approaches to business ethics
yield distinct sets of ethical obligations for managers. Although the
stockholder, stakeholder, and social contract approaches coincide in
prescribing the obligations to provide organizational justice, respect
privacy, and maintain promised confidentiality, they may prescribe widely
differing obligations in other respects.
But whatever the precise
configuration of managers’ ethical obligations, managers are obviously
required to make good faith efforts to honor them. This requires, at a
minimum, that managers know what is going on within their organization.
Although this may sound simple, in an organization of any considerable
size, it is not. Many features of an organization’s structure can impede the
flow of information within the organization. Most large organizations are
beset with what have been called “organizational blocks”—obstructions to
information that result from “practices that are quite legitimate and
inevitable in any complex organization,”267 and constitute the “unintended
consequence[s] of organizational operating and control systems.”268 Thus,
features such as the effect of strong role models in the organization, the
strict line of command, the development of task group cohesiveness, the
separation of decision-making authority, and the division of work between
different units of the organization have all been identified as organizational
blocks.269 Further, the internal dynamics of individual advancement within
organizations can also greatly hamper the flow of information. As
individuals with differential bits of knowledge seek to avoid blame for
negative outcomes and claim credit for positive ones, information becomes
increasingly distorted and non-specific.270 Indeed, the barriers to the free
266. E.g., Jonathan D. Glater, Enron Holders in Pact With Andersen Overseas Firms,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2002, at C3 (illustrating the affects of an indictment on a financial
services company).
267. Waters, supra note 264, at 153.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 153-57.
270. See Robert Jackall, Moral Mazes: Bureaucracy and Managerial Work, 5 HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 120 (claiming that a prominent characteristic of the authority
system in American businesses is that details are pushed down and credit is pushed up, thus,
creating great pressure on middle managers not only to transmit good news but to protect
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flow of information within organizations that arise because “[c]orporations
compartmentalize knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties
and operations into smaller components”271 were the basis for the
development of the collective knowledge standard for corporate criminal
responsibility.272
This means that corporate managers cannot meet their obligation to
ensure that their organization is functioning both ethically and legally
merely by reviewing the information that reaches their desks. They must
actively seek out the information necessary to form an accurate picture of
what is taking place within their organization. Thus, organizations have a
positive duty to engage in ethical and legal self-assessment.
Organizations usually go about fulfilling this duty in the ways touched
upon in connection with the discussion of confidentiality.273 To learn of
potential ethical problems, organizations set up alternative, usually
confidential, channels of communication that allow employees to voice
ethical concerns without fear of damaging their careers. By utilizing
employee hotlines, ombudsmen, or ethics officers, organizations seek to
circumvent both organizational blocks and the information-distorting
effects of bureaucracy and personal interest. To learn of potential legal
problems, organizations authorize their corporate counsel to gather
information and conduct internal investigations under the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. This allows organizations to avoid organizational
blocks by going directly to the source of the information and to overcome
the obscuring effects of self-interest by assuring employees that their
statements to counsel will not be used against them at a later time. These
mechanisms allow corporate managers to gather the information necessary
to prevent or correct ethical lapses or legal violations.
The problem with this is that the law of white collar crime makes
engaging in such self-assessment a dangerous and potentially costly
activity. This is because, under the Guidelines, any self-assessment that
produces evidence suggestive of criminal activity would trigger a duty to
immediately report the potential violation to the government and to fully
cooperate in any resulting investigation, if the organization wishes to
receive the culpability score reduction for cooperation. But because
organizations are strictly liable for the offenses of their employees and
because the reward for cooperation under the Guidelines is not immunity
from prosecution, but reduced penalties upon conviction,274 organizations
their corporations, their bosses, and themselves in the process).
271. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
273. See supra text accompanying note 236.
274. The Thompson Memorandum allows federal prosecutors to consider an
organization’s cooperation in deciding whether to bring an indictment against it, but it
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are placed in the position of having to aid in their own prosecution. There
is considerably less incentive to undertake voluntary self-assessment when,
by doing so, an organization may be developing the evidence that will lead
to its conviction of a criminal offense. Furthermore, to receive the
culpability score reduction for cooperation, organizations must disclose “all
pertinent information known by the organization.”275 If this information
was elicited by corporate counsel pursuant to the attorney-client privilege,
doing so will require waiver of the privilege. But because waiving the
privilege with regard to any outside party waives it with regard to all
outside parties—because the courts do not recognize the doctrine of
selective waiver276—any information the organization discloses to the
government will also be discoverable by private parties. As a result, an
organization that undertakes a self-assessment is practically inviting civil
litigation since any evidence of wrongdoing will be made public.
Once again, the law of white collar crime creates a conflict for corporate
managers. Ethically, they have a duty to undertake the type of selfassessment necessary to ensure that their organization is meeting its ethical
and legal obligations. If they elect to undertake such an assessment,
however, and then discover potential criminal activity, they must either
reveal this information to the government, rendering the organization liable
to both criminal penalties and civil damages awards, or conceal the

clearly does not require them to refrain from indicting cooperating organizations. See
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B) (stating, “[A] corporation’s offer of
cooperation does not automatically entitle it to immunity from prosecution. A corporation
should not be able to escape liability merely by offering up its directors, officers,
employees, or agents as in lieu of its own prosecution.”). In its testimony before the Ad Hoc
Advisory Group on the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, the Department of Justice
made clear that it considers a reduction in penalty, not immunity from prosecution, to be the
proper reward for an organization’s cooperation, stating that “[w]e also believe the
guidelines appropriately encourage and reward full and meaningful cooperation by
permitting a corporation to reduce its punishment by lowering its culpability score if the
corporation thoroughly discloses all pertinent information—specifically information that is
sufficient for the government to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the
individuals responsible for the criminal conduct.” Testimony of the United States
Department of Justice 10 (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
corp/ph11_02/t_comey.pdf.
Further, it is clear that organizations possess no self-evaluation privilege that entitles
them to withhold the results of their self-assessments from federal prosecutors or any
government agency. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding that “[w]hatever may be the status of the ‘self-evaluative’ privilege in the
context of private litigation, courts with apparent uniformity have refused it application,
where . . . the documents in question have been sought by a governmental agency”); see
also Catherine L. Fornias, The Fifth Circuit Reconsiders Application of the Work Product
Doctrine and Privilege of Self-Evaluation: In Re Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Co., 76 TUL.
L. REV. 247, 252 (2001).
275. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5 cmt. 12.
276. See United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 685 (1st Cir. 1997)
(describing selective waiver as “the provision of otherwise privileged communications to
one outsider while withholding them from another.”).
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information, rendering the organization liable to severely enhanced
criminal penalties if the information subsequently comes to light. On the
other hand, if they do not undertake a self-assessment, there is a chance that
any wrongdoing that may be occurring will never be discovered, and
further, that if it later comes to light through the ordinary corporate
reporting channels, the organization can cooperate with the government at
that time. Under these circumstances, the least damaging course of action
can appear to be to refrain from undertaking efforts at self-assessment at
all. Indeed, there is evidence that many organizations avoid formal selfassessment because they are aware that an organization that undertakes one
“can inadvertently land itself in serious legal trouble.”277 For example, a
survey of major U.S. corporations undertaken by the Center for Effective
Organizations at the University of Southern California suggested that
organizational self-assessments are underutilized because corporate
directors “are worried that any record of self-criticism might come back to
haunt them in a shareholder suit or a government investigation” and “are
fearful that [damaging] statements will show up in court proceedings (or be
leaked to the press by plaintiffs’ attorneys).”278
Think back to the third vignette with which I began this article. Imagine
you are the new CEO of Endrun, trying to bring the company back from the
brink of insolvency. Imagine further that the financial condition of the
company has recently begun to improve and that you believe that if Endrun
can weather the next six months, you may be able to return it to
profitability. Although you have no reason to believe that any of Endrun’s
current employees are engaged in illegal activities, you are conscious of the
fact that as a newcomer to the company, there may be things you are
unaware of. Should you authorize an ethical/legal self-assessment? Is it
even ethical to do so if you know that one more public scandal would
destroy the company? Precisely what obligation do you have to undertake
an ethical self-assessment when the discovery of any wrongdoing must be
made public and can subject the corporation to criminal penalties and civil
liability?
CONCLUSION
Let us conclude by returning to the quiz with which this article began.
Viewed from a strictly legal perspective, it is now clear that the correct
answer to all three questions is ‘e.’ Yet, it is doubtful whether many people
would chose ‘e’ as representing the ethically correct course of action.
Consider the first question on the quiz. Legally speaking, ‘a’ and ‘c’
277. David A. Nadler, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2003, at B2.
278. Id.
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represent the most dangerous courses of action. In both cases, the CEO is
electing not to meet the Thompson Memorandum’s and Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of cooperation, thereby subjecting the
corporation to increased risk of indictment and significantly enhanced
penalties if convicted. Further, if in aiding Marsha Tudor in her defense
under ‘a’ or in preparing the corporation’s defense under ‘c,’ corporate
counsel or anyone in corporate management suggests that any MTS
employee assert his or her Fifth Amendment right or otherwise refrain from
voluntarily cooperating with the government, the corporation risks the
culpability score enhancement for obstruction of justice.
Both ‘b’ and ‘d’ are marginally better, but still dangerous, choices. With
regard to ‘b,’ it is clearly false that the matter does not concern the
corporation. Tudor is charged with securities fraud for attempting to prop
up the value of MTS stock. As the Chairman of the Board of Directors of
MTS, this conduct is clearly within the scope of her employment. Hence,
MTS is strictly liable for her offense. By instructing the corporation to take
no action, the CEO is, in essence, instructing it to refuse to cooperate with
the government and thereby sacrificing the opportunity to lower the
corporation’s risk of being indicted and to reduce any potential penalties
the corporation may incur. On the other hand, he or she is also making it
less likely that the corporation will receive the culpability score
enhancement for obstruction of justice. With regard to ‘d,’ the CEO’s offer
to cooperate with the government will be insufficient either to reduce the
risk of indictment or to earn the culpability score reduction for cooperation.
By acting to preserve the corporation’s defenses and promises of
confidentiality, the CEO is refusing to disclose all pertinent information
possessed by MTS, and hence failing to meet the Thompson
Memorandum’s and Sentencing Guidelines’ definition of cooperation. His
or her offer to cooperate in other respects does, however, greatly reduce the
chance that the corporation will receive the culpability score enhancement
for obstruction of justice.
In electing any of options ‘a’ through ‘d,’ the CEO is essentially betting
the corporation’s interest on Tudor’s exoneration, even though he or she is
not sure that Tudor is innocent. Only ‘e’ allows the corporation to improve
its legal position regardless of the outcome of Tudor’s case. By authorizing
the corporation to plead guilty, the CEO is meeting the requirement that the
corporation “clearly demonstrate[ ] recognition and affirmative acceptance
of responsibility for its criminal conduct.”279 By waiving attorney-client
privilege and turning over Tudor’s records, he or she is meeting the
requirement that the corporation disclose “all pertinent information known
279. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8C2.5(g)(1).
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by the organization.”280 And by turning over all relevant records in the
corporation’s possession, the CEO is ensuring that there can be no effort at
concealment or alteration that could constitute obstruction of justice. These
actions satisfy all the requirements for the five point culpability score
reduction for self-reporting, cooperation, and acceptance of responsibility,
and maximize the likelihood that the DOJ will decide not to indict the
corporation. From a purely legal perspective, ‘e’ is obviously the correct
choice.
‘E’ is not obviously the ethically correct choice, however. Tudor
founded and built the company and her ongoing association with it has
been a large factor in its continued success. Her hard work over the years
has provided all of MTS’ employees with the opportunity for successful
and rewarding careers. Under these circumstances, it is not unreasonable to
believe that MTS owes her a duty of loyalty. There is certainly good
reason to believe that it owes her at least the presumption of innocence and
due process. If this is the case, then from the ethical perspective, ‘a’ is not
necessarily an outlandish choice. But perhaps there is no duty of loyalty in
a business setting or, if there is, a corporate officer’s duty to protect his or
her company’s other stakeholders overrides it. In that case, ‘b,’ and
especially ‘c’ and ‘d,’ may appear to be appropriate ethical choices. ‘E’ on
the other hand, is problematic. To the extent that Tudor communicated
with corporate counsel under the promise of confidentiality inherent in the
attorney-client privilege, the corporation’s gratuitous disclosure of those
communications to the government would constitute the ethical equivalent
of fraud. Further, by turning over to the government all records of Tudor’s
appointments, phone calls, and e-mails without regard to whether they
contain job-related or purely personal information, the corporation may be
violating Tudor’s right to privacy. From an ethical perspective, ‘e’ is
almost certainly the wrong choice.
Now consider the second question on the quiz. Legally speaking, ‘a’
again represents the most dangerous choice. In the first place, the company
is obviously sacrificing the five point culpability score reduction for
cooperation by aiding Fox in putting on a defense. It is also greatly
increasing the likelihood that it will be indicted by ignoring the Thompson
Memorandum’s warning that, in deciding whether to bring an indictment,
the DOJ will consider whether “the corporation appears to be protecting its
culpable employees . . . either through the advancing of attorneys fees,
through retaining the employees without sanction for their misconduct, or
through providing information to the employees about the government’s

280. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 12.
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investigation pursuant to a joint defense agreement . . . .”281 In addition, by
retaining Fox without punishment, the company is sacrificing the three
point reduction for having an effective compliance program since,
according to the Guidelines, “[a]dequate discipline of individuals
responsible for an offense is a necessary component of [the]
enforcement”282 required for a compliance program to be considered
effective. And, as in Tudor’s case, if the company advises any of its
employees to refrain from voluntarily cooperating with the government, it
risks the three point enhancement for obstruction of justice.
‘B,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d’ represent slightly better, but still dangerous choices.
Under ‘b,’ the company will still lose the reductions for having an effective
compliance program by not disciplining or firing Fox and for cooperation
by failing to satisfy the requirements of the Thompson Memorandum and
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, but it is unlikely to incur the
enhancement for obstruction of justice. Under ‘c’ and ‘d,’ the company
may gain the three point reduction for its compliance program, but it is still
sacrificing the opportunity to avoid indictment or receive the five point
reduction for cooperation by failing to actively aid in Fox’s prosecution.
Once again, ‘e,’ which offers the company an enhanced prospect of
avoiding indictment altogether and of minimizing its fine if indicted and
convicted, is the legally correct choice.
But again, ‘e’ is not the ethically correct choice. Stone Fund hired Fox
straight out of business school and placed him under the direction of one of
the company’s most powerful senior brokers, who was corrupt. By doing
so, the company bears at least some responsibility for Fox’s legal
predicament. If Fox truly did not realize that he was engaged in illegal
activity, and especially if the company learned of Gekko’s activities
through Fox’s queries to corporate counsel, Fox would have been acting as
a loyal, if misguided, employee. Under these circumstances, it is entirely
reasonable to believe that the principle of reciprocity imposes an ethical
obligation on the company to help Fox deal with both his legal troubles and
damaged career prospects. If so, then ‘a’ may represent the ethically
correct course for the company to take. But again, if one does not believe
there is a duty of loyalty in business or believes that managers’ obligations
to the firm’s stakeholders override any such duty, then ‘b,’ and perhaps ‘c’
and ‘d,’ can appear to be ethically acceptable choices. ‘C’ and ‘d’ may
raise questions, however, because firing Fox and, especially firing him and
reporting his activities to the government, will almost certainly damage the
level of trust within the company. Once the employees see that the

281. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 179, § VI(B).
282. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 8B2.1 cmt. 5.
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company will sacrifice someone like Fox to protect its financial interests,
they will be very unlikely to trust any future representation the company
may make to protect their rights and interests. ‘E’ presents even more
problems. By aiding in Fox’s prosecution, the company is acting
punitively toward an employee who is in trouble, at least in part, for
following the directives of its senior management. It is also failing to
honor the promise of confidentiality it extended with the attorney-client
privilege. Much more than either ‘c’ or ‘d,’ such conduct makes it clear
that the company cannot be relied on to protect the interests of its
employees, and will be destructive of the trust between employees and
management that is so important to the successful functioning of a financial
services company. Again, if one disregards its legal advantages, ‘e’ is
almost certainly the ethically wrong choice.
Finally, consider the third question on the quiz. From the legal
perspective, there is little difference among choices ‘a,’ ‘b,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d.’ In
none of these cases can Endrun expect to avoid indictment or receive a
culpability score reduction on the basis of cooperation. To begin with, by
covering Kevin Lie’s legal expenses, the corporation is acting in a way
which, under the Thompson Memorandum, indicates a lack of cooperation.
Further, by preparing a defense or refusing to waive attorney-client
privilege, the corporation is failing to disclose all pertinent information
known to it, and thus, under the Guidelines’ definition, is failing to fully
cooperate with the government. Finally, by putting on a defense, the
corporation is failing to manifest the acceptance of responsibility necessary
for a reduction in culpability score because the “adjustment is not intended
to apply to an organization that puts the government to its burden of proof
at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt.”283
In contrast, ‘e’ meets all legal requirements for cooperation. By
indicating a willingness to plead guilty, Endrun is meeting the requirement
for acceptance of responsibility. And by refusing to pay Lie’s legal
expenses, waiving attorney-client privilege, turning over all potentially
relevant documents to the government, and otherwise aiding in Mr. Lie’s
prosecution, the corporation is meeting all of the other requirements of the
Thompson Memorandum and Organizational Sentencing Guidelines.
These actions maximize Endrun’s chances of avoiding indictment and of
receiving the smallest possible fine if indicted and convicted. Thus, ‘e’ is
again the legally superior choice.
And once again, ‘e’ is ethically the most questionable choice. In this
case, it is not clear whether ‘a’ is the ethically appropriate response. If the
actions that Lie has been indicted for really represented his good faith
283. Id. § 8C2.5 cmt. 13.
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efforts to bring Endrun through a crisis, the corporation may have a duty of
loyalty to help him defend himself. On the other hand, it may be argued
that Lie brought his predicament upon himself by hiring and failing to
adequately supervise corrupt subordinates.
If so, his negligence
significantly damaged the company, and the company may owe him little
loyalty and support. In this case, the ethically appropriate course of action
may be either ‘b,’ ‘c,’ or ‘d.’ Regardless of whether Endrun owes Lie any
active support, it owes him at least the presumption of innocence, which
requires that Endrun meet its obligations to him until it has adequate
evidence that he has behaved improperly. This means that it should honor
both its promise to reimburse his legal expenses and its promise to keep his
communications to corporate counsel confidential. ‘B,’ ‘c,’ and ‘d’ are all
consistent with these obligations. ‘E’ is not. Under ‘e,’ the corporation is
denying Lie the presumption of innocence, abrogating its commitments to
reimburse his legal expenses and maintain promised confidentiality, and
helping the government circumvent Lie’s constitutional right against selfincrimination by attempting to obtain and turn over to the government
documents in his personal possession.284 Discounting its legal effect, ‘e’ is
very unlikely to be the ethically proper course of conduct.
These hypothetical cases show that in the realm of white collar crime,
ethics and compliance are not coextensive. One can be acting in
compliance with all legal requirements and incentives and still be behaving
unethically, and one can be behaving ethically while failing to comply with
various aspects of the law of white collar crime. Fortunately, in most
cases, ethical conduct and legal compliance do in fact coincide. But in an
ever-increasing number of cases, the federal campaign against white collar
crime is directly at odds with the efforts of business people to behave
ethically. Indeed, in business schools throughout the country, future
MBA’s are currently being taught that they have ethical obligations to their
firm’s employees and other stakeholders that can trump the firm’s financial
interest, and that effective management requires adherence to the principles
284. Because Lie is no longer an Endrun employee, the prosecution cannot get access to
documents in his possession by the usual stratagem of issuing a subpoena to Lie in his
corporate capacity. See United States v. John Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3 (In re
Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999), 191 F.3d 173, 183 (2d
Cir. 1999) (concluding that ex-employees may refuse to provide documents of a corporation
where they previously worked by claiming a Fifth Amendment right of production
privilege). Thus, unless the prosecution can meet the “foregone conclusion” test, it cannot
constitutionally get access to the documents in Lie’s possession without the corporation’s
help. See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000) (holding that documents
were not a foregone conclusion where the government failed to show it had prior knowledge
of the existence and whereabouts of such documents); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
411 (1976) (holding that admitting to the existence and location of papers is a foregone
conclusion and does not amount to the level of testimony protected by the Fifth
Amendment).
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of organizational justice and action that is productive of trust between a
firm and its employees. Although the first and third of my hypothetical
cases are obviously based on the Martha Stewart case and the Enron
scandal, the second could be drawn from almost any contemporary
business ethics course. In such a course, this case would be offered to
show why ‘a’ is the ethically correct course of conduct. Why this
divergence between ethics and compliance?
Ethics is concerned with moral desert. Ethically speaking, only morally
blameworthy action should be punished. This is true of the traditional
criminal law as well, which—with certain well-known
exceptions285—is designed to punish only those who have acted in a
morally culpable manner. The inherent liberalism of the traditional
criminal law can be understood as the law’s internal morality, an embedded
code designed to ensure that the law remains true to this purpose. Viewed
in this way, the ban on vicarious criminal liability and the requirement of a
mens rea consisting of intentional or reckless conduct makes perfect sense.
So does the principle of legality’s requirement of clearly defined criminal
offenses, since for conduct that is not obviously malum in se, one acts
culpably only if one knows that his or her conduct is legally prohibited.
And so do the procedural safeguards, which are designed to make it
difficult for those invested with the power to enforce the criminal law to
use it for purposes other than the punishment of morally culpable conduct.
Hence, there is little divergence between ethics and compliance in the
traditional criminal law because the law’s inherent liberalism essentially
writes ethics into the law.
In the beginning of this article, I defined the law of white collar crime as
the law designed to police the behavior of those involved in business for
honest dealing and regulatory compliance. I might just as well have
defined it as the body of criminal law that cannot be effectively enforced
consistent with the law’s internal morality. Although the inherent
liberalism of the traditional criminal law keeps the law true to its purpose
of punishing only morally culpable conduct, it does so by reducing the
efficiency of governmental law enforcement efforts. In the context of an
undertaking as monumentally difficult as policing the business
environment of the entire United States for honest dealing and regulatory
compliance, this reduction in efficiency is sufficient to render the law
virtually unenforceable. Given this, it should be completely unsurprising
that the development of the law of white collar crime described in Part II of
this article consisted of the evolution of various mechanisms for

285. Consider, for example, the law of statutory rape, and various aspects of the law of
conspiracy, and felony murder.
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circumventing the liberal characteristics of the traditional criminal law. As
both the courts and Congress have continually pointed out, doing so was
the only way to prevent white collar criminal law from becoming a dead
letter.
The substantive protections provided by the ban on vicarious criminal
liability, the mens rea requirement, and the principle of legality clearly had
to be abandoned or relaxed if the statutes against white collar crime were to
be enforced. The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this in creating
corporate criminal responsibility, abandoning the ban on vicarious criminal
liability purely on enforcement grounds—that is, because if “corporations
may not be held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and
purposes of their agents, . . . many offenses might go unpunished”286 and
because preserving the ban “would virtually take away the only means of
effectually controlling the subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed
at.”287 The Court similarly justified the relaxation of the mens rea
requirement to permit conviction for merely negligent, and even entirely
innocent actions on the basis that, due to the “increasingly numerous and
detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of
particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health,
safety or welfare, . . . [the preservation of the scienter requirement would]
impair[ ] the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as
presently constituted.”288 Finally, the attenuation of the principle of
legality necessary to permit the creation of vaguely-defined, broad offenses
such as mail fraud and RICO was justified on the grounds that such
offenses were necessary to “cope with the new varieties of fraud that the
ever-inventive American ‘con artist’ is sure to develop”289 and “to bring
criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear on the unlawful activities
of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and
remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope
and impact.”290
Effective enforcement similarly required circumvention of the traditional
law’s procedural safeguards. Thus, the Court justified denying the Fifth
286. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95
(1909).
287. Id. at 495-96. The courts were still adhering to this justification three-quarters of a
century later, holding, for example, that organizations were strictly liable for the actions of
their employees on the ground that the “identification of the particular agents responsible
for a Sherman Act violation is especially difficult, and their conviction and punishment is
peculiarly ineffective as a deterrent. At the same time, conviction and punishment of the
business entity itself is likely to be both appropriate and effective.” United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972).
288. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1952).
289. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 407 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
290. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 84 Stat. 922, 993
(1970).
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination not only to corporations,
but also to individuals subpoenaed in their capacity as employees of
corporations on the ground that not doing so “would have a detrimental
impact on the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one
of the most serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities.”291
Secondary offenses such as money laundering, false statements, and
obstruction of justice, which are designed solely to aid in law enforcement
efforts, allow prosecutors to sidestep the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt by providing, in the words of two of them, “the ability to
prosecute a wrongdoer when there is either insufficient evidence of the
underlying criminal conduct or insufficient evidence connecting the
wrongdoer to the underlying criminal conduct.”292
Similarly, the
presumption of innocence and the attorney-client privilege are
compromised by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines’ culpability
score adjustments for obstruction of justice, compliance programs, and
cooperation, which, being specifically designed to aid law enforcement,
effectively punish organizations that maintain their innocence or assert the
privilege.
The law of white collar crime, then, is that portion of the criminal law
that has been significantly divorced from the law’s internal morality. The
essential purpose of white collar criminal law is not the punishment of
morally culpable conduct, but the effective enforcement of congressionallycreated rules of behavior and regulations. To the extent that these rules and
regulations prohibit conduct that is not clearly morally blameworthy, it is
reasonable to expect the requirements of compliance with the law and the
demands of ethics to diverge. And this is precisely what has happened.
As long as the imposition of criminal sanctions on organizations and
individuals who commit white collar offenses remains a priority, there is no
way out of the dilemma this situation creates. Effective criminal
enforcement requires the type of measures that create ethical dilemmas for
conscientious business people. Structuring the law to allow business
people to honor their ethical obligations would be equivalent to restoring
the liberal characteristics of the traditional criminal law that render the law
of white collar crime unenforceable. But before simply accepting this state
of affairs, it is worth considering whether the criminal punishment of those
who commit white collar offenses should remain a priority. For it is not
clear how much is gained by such punishment.
White collar criminal offenses consist in regulatory violations and
deceptive or dishonest business practices not already punishable under the

291. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988).
292. WILLIAMS, JR. & WHITNEY, supra note 150, at 15.
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traditional criminal law. If the defendant is an organization, it can only be
punished financially. If the organization’s offense consists of a breach of a
regulation, it is already subject to a civil penalty for the violation. In this
case, a criminal conviction serves only to increase the amount of the money
the organization must pay. But if a greater financial penalty is appropriate,
the obvious thing to do is to increase the size of the civil penalty, not create
a duplicative criminal offense. If the offense consists in deceptive or
dishonest behavior by one of the organization’s employees that results in a
loss to the organization’s stockholders or any other party, the organization
is subject to civil lawsuit and the payment of compensatory and, if the
conduct is intentional or reckless, punitive damages. Once again, criminal
punishment can only increase the amount of money the organization must
pay. And because this additional purely punitive amount is paid by the
organization’s shareholders who are innocent of wrongdoing rather than by
the actual guilty parties, it cannot be justified on retributive grounds.
It can be argued that forcing organizations to pay an additional amount
beyond the compensatory and punitive damages resulting from civil
lawsuits is justified by its deterrent effect. The claim is that threatening the
organization with additional monetary losses will make it more vigilant in
supervising its employees to ensure that they do not engage in dishonest or
deceptive behavior. There is reason to doubt this claim, however. Because
the threat of civil liability already provides organizations with adequate
incentives to properly supervise their employees, additional criminal
liability can only be over-deterrence. Organizations are already strictly
liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of their
employment. Should an organization fail to exercise proper oversight to
prevent deceptive or fraudulent practices by its employees, it can be made
to pay not only compensatory damages, but also potentially massive
punitive damages. Further, because civil plaintiffs are not subject to the
restrictions that the criminal law imposes upon prosecutors, it is easier for
them to establish liability. The type of complaints civil plaintiffs may bring
are not limited by the principle of legality; plaintiffs’ efforts at discovery
cannot be thwarted by a Fifth Amendment privilege; the defendant is not
vested with a presumption of innocence that the plaintiff must overcome;
and the plaintiff is not required to prove the elements of his or her case
beyond reasonable doubt. It is difficult to see how the threat of additional
criminal liability, which is more difficult to establish and, hence, less likely
to be imposed, can increase the organization’s vigilance. On the other
hand, as the Arthur Andersen case demonstrates, because a criminal
conviction can deplete the resources an organization has available to pay
civil judgments, it can have the untoward effect of making it impossible for
victims to recover their losses. Andersen had actually negotiated a $750
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million settlement with Enron’s shareholders which fell through when the
firm was indicted.293 Given the disparity between a $750 million
settlement and the relatively small fine that can be levied for obstruction of
justice, it is difficult to see what end is served by a criminal conviction that
not only wipes out the firm’s ability to compensate victims, but also
destroys the careers of thousands of Andersen employees who had nothing
to do with the Enron case or the destruction of documents.
The situation may be different, however, when the defendant is an
individual. Unlike organizations, individuals can be incarcerated. Perhaps
the imprisonment of individuals who commit white collar offenses serves
important retributivist or deterrent ends. But then again, perhaps not.
When the offense is a public welfare offense that requires no mens rea,
or an offense that requires only ordinary negligence, it is unclear how
incarceration, or punishment of any kind, advances either end. Because the
defendant has not acted in a morally blameworthy manner in committing
such offenses, punishment cannot be justified on retributivist grounds.
Further, because it was not the defendant’s conscious plan to violate the
regulation, the threat of punishment can have no deterrent effect. In cases
such as these, the defendant may owe others or society compensation or the
disgorgement of wrongfully acquired gains, but no legitimate end is served
by his or her criminal punishment. And if a monetary payment is
appropriate, this can be attained through the imposition of a civil penalty
for the violation.
But what about individuals who intentionally violate regulations or
engage in deceptive or dishonest business practices? In such cases, the
defendants have both acted culpably, meriting punishment, and can be
deterred by the threat of incarceration. But here is where the perfect
becomes the enemy of the good. Keep in mind that white collar offenses
consist of regulatory violations and deceptive or dishonest behavior that is
not punishable under the traditional criminal law. The campaign against
white collar crime is not a campaign against actual fraud, which is already
subject to punishment, but against the type of behavior that does not
amount to actual fraud but is nevertheless unfair, deceptive, or dishonest.
In essence, then, the purpose of the campaign against white collar crime is
to raise the ethical level of business behavior above the baseline supplied
by the traditional criminal law.
Individuals who unfairly violate regulations or engage in deceptive or
dishonest business practices do so for financial gain. If they are
discovered, they will probably be discharged from their jobs and have their
careers destroyed. If their conduct amounts to actual fraud, they will be
293. Glater, supra note 266, at C3.
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subject to prosecution under the rules of the traditional criminal law. If it
does not, they will be subject to civil lawsuits that will cause them to at
least give up all ill-gotten gains and probably will impoverish them.
Hence, the market and civil liability sanctions against such individuals are
considerable.
Because the imposition of additional financial penalties on such
individuals would be pointless, the effort to subject them to the criminal
sanction can only be for purposes of incarceration. Such punishment can
be justified on retributive grounds if the market and civil liability sanctions
are truly insufficient relative to the defendants’ culpability. It can also be
justified on deterrent grounds if the threat of imprisonment would deter at
least some individuals who would not be deterred by the prospect of the
loss of their careers and wealth. It must be conceded, however, that the
gain in either retributive or deterrent value, although real, is relatively
small.
But at what cost are these gains purchased? The answer to this question
has been the subject of this article. The cost of this crusade to achieve
perfect justice is the abandonment of the internal morality of the criminal
law and the ethical dilemmas it imposes on the business community. It
appears that in order to utilize the criminal law to raise the ethical level of
business behavior among those given to unscrupulous action, we must
incentivize unethical behavior on the part of those who are conscientious.
This is a textbook example of a Pyrrhic victory. Here truly is a game that is
not worth the candle.
Given this situation, let me conclude this article with the thought that the
solution to the problem of white collar crime might not consist in more
vigorous federal enforcement efforts, but in no such enforcement efforts at
all.

